CHAPTER II LEGAL STRATEGY IN DEFENSIVE ECONOMIC WARFARE THE SUGAR ENCOUNTER by Alford, Neill H.
International Law Studies—Volume 56 
MODERN ECONOMIC WARFARE 
(LAW AND THE NAVAL PARTICIPANT) 
Neill H. Alford, Jr. (Author) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. 
Government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College. 

CHAPTER II 
LEGAL STRATEGY IN 
DEFENSIVE ECONOMIC WARFARE 
THE SUGAR ENCOUNTER 
INTRODUCTION 
The "Sugar Encounter" between the United States and Castro 
Cuba was a step in a progression ~f events leading to naval participa-
tion in such transactions as the Cuban Quarantine of 1962 and 
the Cuban land blockade of the Guantanamo Naval Base. As with 
most forms of economic warfare, the "Sugar Encounter~' evolved 
towards mutual political postures in which naval sea and air power 
became logical instruments of coercive economic policy. 
But apart from this demonstration from subsequent events of 
the need for an understanding by naval participants in economic 
warfare of prior economic warfare postures, the "Sugar Encounter" 
demonstrated dramatically, if not for the first time, the economic 
warfare potential of the Soviet and Sino Communist Blocs, acting 
singly or in unison, and the kinds of defensive legal problems the 
United States would have to solve to meet this emerging economic 
warfare threat. 
In the "Sugar Encounter," the United States attempted to meet 
an "economic. sortie" mounted by Castro Cuba by manipulating the 
Cuban sugar imports permitted into the United States and by 
supplementary measures in the form of "protracted harassment." 
This Cuban economic sortie was mounted to divide opinion in the 
United States and prevent decisive action as communization of the 
Cuban state became increasingly apparent. 
As a delaying tactic, this economic sortie was effective. The 
United States defensive measures proved comparatively fruitless. 
The description of the evolution of this defensive sugar policy in 
this Chapter serves to develop three features without which con-
temporary international la'v concerning economic warfare and 
legal strategy as a feature of economic warfare policy cannot be 
fully understood. 
The first feature is the posture of the monolithic state trader, 
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particularly the Communist monolithic state trader, and the impact 
of this economic institution upon economic warfare and upon 
international law. 
The second feature is the national law of the United States bear-
ing upon economic warfare and the major problems in its ad-
ministration. No international legal pr~blems concerning economic 
warfare can be fully understood by naval officers unless relevant 
national law is first appreciated. 
The third feature is the continuing chain of economic coercion 
and the ways in which this chain is affected by community inter-
vention. The Chapter thus considers not only the "Sugar Encounter" 
as such, but also major economic measures put into operation upon 
initial failure of the United States defensive manipulation of the 
sugar quota. The interests affected by this complicated process were 
varied, and a naval officer in conducting economic warfare must 
become accustomed to identifying interests affected by his action 
and how the parties interested are likely to respond. 
The materials in the Chapter are essentially descriptive. They 
provide the basis for a detailed analysis of both national and inter-
national legal problems in Part II of this book. 
A. THE MONOLITHIC STATE TRADER IN ECONOMIC 
WARFARE 
Within the past fifty years there has been an increased emphasis 
upon elements of timing and speed in executing economic war-
fare plans and a similar increased emphasis upon the need for 
accurate aim and careful direction of offensive economic action. 
If offensive economic action is aimed accurately, directed carefully, 
executed decisively and s·wiftly, and terminated when the desired 
psychical effect is achieved, by-products of possible disadvantage to 
the sponsoring state are likely to be avoided. The increased emphasis 
upon these elements results partly from the presence of the mono-
lithic state trader in commercial channels. 
1. Competitive Advantages and Disadvantages of the Monolithic 
State Trader in Economic Warfare 
The foreign trade of the Soviet Union was one of the first private 
enterprises nationalized after the Revolution of 1917. The internal 
economy of the Soviet Union is now centrally and rigidly con-
trolled. Its controlled economy has been substantially duplicated 
in the satellites, and by Red China; and ·while the efficiencies of the 
Bloc systems, the details of their organization, and the capacities 
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of the various Bloc states to engage in economic warfare differ, the 
advantages and disadvantages of the monolithic state-trading system 
are the same for all Bloc states. 
Centralized control of domestic processes for distributing con-
sumer goods tends to instill "use discipline" in the population. A 
low standard of living is either un\vittingly accepted or grudgingly 
tolerated. Supplies required for domestic consumption are thus low 
and limited in variety. Imports are less, depending upon the 
efficiency of the local productive processes, than they would be if 
there was no "use discipline" or a higher standard of living. 
"Surpluses" can be generated to be marketed or donated abroad 
to support foreign policies. The Soviet Union, for example, despite 
the agricultural dislocation of "\Vorld War II, could export 400,000 
tons of wheat to France in 1946. 
Manufactured goods available for export are likely to be for 
industrial rather than for consumer use. This tends to concentrate 
Bloc markets in areas with a lo\v consumer demand. Bloc products 
cannot compete effectively with Free World consumer goods in 
higher consumer demand areas. To the extent consumer demand can 
be stimulated in low demand areas, local resources channeled into 
Bloc trade can be progressively restricted. 
Labor unrest, actual or potential, is a source of weakness even in 
a heavily policed Bloc community. Bloc populations, already on 
a low standard of living, are especially sensitive to disturbances in 
their food supply, either by interfering with their agricultural 
production or by blocking imports of food. 
As there are no major private entrepreneurs to protect, tariffs, 
quotas and exchange controls to limit the flow of imports are 
unnecessary, and this places the State Trader in a desirable bargain-
ing position with "free-enterprise" states. A Bloc state may import 
foreign products in excess of local needs simply to develop a foreign 
market for future political leverage. Purchases, clearly in excess of 
Soviet or satellite needs, have been made of cocoa from Ghana, 
cotton from Egypt and the Sudan and rubber from Cey Ion. 
The absence of a "profit concepf' in the "free-enterprise" Sense 
also has advantages for the Bloc state. While the quality of in-
dustrial goods has been lo\v in many instances, prices and credit 
terms offered, together \vith opportunities for barter, have tempted 
countries \vith low reserves of convertible foreign exchange. Italian 
firms selling chemicals and synthetic fibers to the Soviet Union 
have accepted oil, cotton and coal in payment. To the extent that 
Bloc trade presents a competitive threat in a Free World country, 
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it is difficult to deal 'vith Bloc competition with laws keyed to 
profit concepts. In the words of Samuel Pisar: 1 
* * * Western antidumping la,vs * * * cannot adequately 
cope with the possibility of Communist dumping or undersell-
ing. For example, there is no effective "\vay of determining the 
'fair value' of Communist products under the present terms of 
our Antidumping Act as amended in 1958.2 'Foreign Market 
Value' is a useless criterion because there is no free home market 
in a Communist country. 'Constructed value' is equally useless 
because Co1nmunist cost of production is an outlandish notion 
which has no relation to normal Western cost accounting or pric-
ing principles. * * * 
A..'?oviet Trade Control StructMre 
But by far the most important basis of competitive advantage 
in economic "\varfare of the Bloc state is the governmental structure 
of trade control. This stands as a barrier to economic attack by the 
traditional forms of "protracted" economic harassment and provides 
machinery for incisive economic warfare direction. 
The foreign trade of the Soviet Union is coordinated by the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade. The Minister is a member of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU. Four geographic divisions within the 
Ministry, two concerned 'vith Bloc and two concerned with non-
Bloc countries, deal 'vith trade on a country-by-country basis. Other 
divisions within the Ministry deal 'vith particular types of goods 
and with particular functions, such as finance, law, transport and 
personnel. 
Trading is done by 25 government owned corporations. Some 
specialize in trade in particular items. Others specialize in trade 
'vith particular areas. The corporate organizations differ depending 
upon the conditions under 'vhich they work. AMTORG, the cor-
poration specializing in trade 'vith the United States, is a New 
York commercial corporation, O"\vned by the Bank for Foreign 
Trade in Moscow. 
The Ministry of Foreign Trade is represented abroad by trade 
delegations. The members of these, unlike the officers of the cor-
porations, such as A~fTORG, belong to the embassy staff and enjoy 
diplomatic immunity. The trade delegations collect economic intel-
1 Pisar, A New Look at Trade Policy Towards the Commu,nist Bloc. (Mate-
rial prepared for the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the .Joint 
Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, Doc. 76695, 1961) 24-25. 
2 Antidumping Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 11 (1921), 68 Stat. 1138 (1954), 72 Stat. 
583 (1958), 19 U.S. Code 160 et seq. 
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ligence and serve as agents for those trading corporations which 
are not domesticated in the country 'vith which business is to be done. 
I£ the country concerned does not have diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union, the functions o£ the trade delegation may 
be performed by a special group. This may be headed by the 
Minister o£ Foreign Trade i£ the political importance o£ the mission 
justifies his participation. 
Paralleling in some respects the functions o£ the Ministry o£ 
Foreign Trade is a state committee, GKES. This committee plans 
foreign economic operations and supervises execution o£ these plans. 
The Ministry o£ Foreign Trade, by contrast, is charged principally 
'vith negotiation and completion o£ trade agreements. 
Although little has been published concerning the control and 
operations o£ GKES, the committee appears to provide the political 
direction o£ trade o£ the Soviet Union and to coordinate Soviet trade 
and Soviet aid. It has the characteristics o£ a highly placed eco-
nomic warfare staff. Technicians installing an industrial plant or 
furnishing advice as to its operation in an underdeveloped country-
in short, the persons who would be channels for Soviet political 
influence-are controlled by GKES rather than by the Ministry. 
Economic activity o£ the satellites is coordinated by GKES 
through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ( CEMA). 
CEMA is concerned primarily 'vith intra-Bloc trade but deals also 
'vith foreign trade o£ the satellites. It is a consultative committee 
'vith a permanent conference o£ deputies, ·who meet weekly in 
Moscow, a secretariat and a policy body made up o£ chairmen o£ 
the state planning commissions within the respective satellites. 
Permanent working committees maintain liaison with the state 
planning committees. CEMA provides a point at which marketing 
information can be exchanged and satellite programs can be 
developed to support Soviet political strategies. 
The defensive capabilities o£ this system are impressive. Trade 
conditions, like military and political plans, are a state secret. A 
private corporation o£ a Free vVorld state, a convenient institution 
for economic action in the past, must do its business in the Bloc 
state through a government agency. It has no direct contact with 
its market. 
Commercial contracts are "canned." The contracts contain pro vi-
sions which are nonnegotiable and 'vhich must be accepted by the 
Free World corporation in order to do business. For example, most 
o£ the Soviet contracts stipulate for arbitration o£ disputes arising 
concerning their terms before the Moscow Arbitration Court. The 
inconvenience to the Soviet trading corporation o£ litigation in the 
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state in which the private corporation is domiciled is thus sub-
stantially a voided. There is a remote chance, of course, that the dis-
pute might be brought before an international tribunal.3 
The offensive capabilities of the Bloc state' trader are as imposing 
as its capabilities for defense. The highly centralized trade and aid 
organization probes unremittingly for points of legal weakness. 
The Bloc trading policy is basically divisive. Bilateral trade 
agreements are attempted, specialized to the country with which 
the agreement is negotiated. ~Iultilateral trade agreements, which 
might provide a foundation upon ·which Free World states could 
confront the Bloc on a common basis, are avoided. 
Bloc trade activity can thus be conducted flexibly and opportuni-
istically without the legal impediments which many Western states 
have accepted in order to obtain reciprocal trade concessions. In 
writing of the diffieulty in regulating trade relations with Com-
munist countries, Mr. Pisar states: 4 
The steady proliferation of bilateral agreements and barter 
arrangements constitute an increasing obstacle to the assimila-
tion of Communist trade into the multi-lateral framework of 
world commerce. Existing arrangements such as GATT, the 
International Monetary Fund, various trade associations and 
commodity exchanges, as well as more specialized international 
conventions (e.g., arbritration, patents, copyright), cannot in 
general be expected to cope with the peculiar phenomenon of 
Communist trade. Either Communist countries refuse to adhere 
to such established 'gentlemen's agreements' or, if they do 
adhere, their obligations assume a distorted meaning in the 
context of a state-operated market. 
A Soviet trading corporation can contact its buyers directly in 
Free World states. It can circulate catalogs, stimulate demands, 
take advantage of local patents and glean much economic intel-
ligence. 
Soviet Bloc Economic lVarfare Techniques 
The Soviet Union began to implement its foreign policy by eco-
nomic measures in 1923 as it recovered from the internal disloca-
tion produced by revolutioR, famine and blockade. But no major 
a Recourse to adjudication will depend upon the willingness of both the state 
of domicile and the Soviet Union to participate. The corporation would have no 
special status to appear as a litigant and would have to be represented by its 
state of domicile or by some other state which might claim the right to extend 
its protection. 
4 l)" "t 26 tsar. op cz ., . 
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use of 'vealth as an offensive 'veapon 'vas made until after the death 
of Stalin. 
Having removed most of Eastern Europe and mainland China 
from the aegis of 'Vestern political and economic influence, it 
'vas Stalin's theory that denial of this market to the West 'vould 
undermine the economies of Free World nations and stimulate an 
internecine struggle among them for fragments of the remaining 
1narket. Trade ,vith the West remained at the minimum necessary 
to n1eet military and do1nestic requirements of the Soviet Bloc. 
This "dual" or "parallel" 1narkets theory 'vas repudiated after 
the death of Stalin. Trade and aid have since been combined to form 
a cutting edge for the Soviet political 'vedge. Primacy is given 
to one or the other as the characteristics of the political target 
"'arrant. In almost every instance Bloc trade and aid have been 
skillfully controlled and coordinated.5 
Bloc purchases in the West usually have been of raw materials, 
such as rubber and fats, processed items, such as oils, synthetic 
fibers, plastics and heavy chemicals; fabricated metals, such as 
plates and sheets, structural shapes and tubing; machinery, such 
as machine tools and electrical equipment; and major fabricated 
devices such as tra,vlers and locomotives. Interest has been demon-
strated in purchasing entire plants 'vith the technical information 
to operate them. These purchases often involve performances by 
t'vo or more corporations, some furnishing design and machinery 
and others technical information and training necessary to operate 
the plant. 
Bloc strategy, as developed in the late 1950·s, combined conquest 
by economic accretion 'vith the "economic sortie'~ as inviting points 
of weakness in Free World nations appeared. The trading pattern 
of the target area is gradually reoriented to,vards the Bloc by 
increasing purchases of its products. These purchases usually are 
5 The most recent comprehensive studies of Soviet economic warfare are 
Allen, Soviet Economic Warfare (1960) and Allen, Communist Economic War-
fare (1960) (Committee on Un-American Activities, H. R., 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
Doc. 51038). Also suggested are Aubrey, Co-existence (1961) ; Berliner, Soviet 
Economic Aid (1958) ; Benham, Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries 
(1961) ; Knorr, Ruble Diplomacy (1956) ; Kovner, The Challenge of Coexistence 
(1961) ; Mikesell and Wells, The Soviet Econ01nic Offensive (1959) ; 'l'he Threat 
of Soviet Eco·nomic Policy (Department of State Publication 7234) (1961) ; 
and Q.ommunist Economic Policy in the Less Developed Countries (Department 
of State Publication 7020) (1960). Pisar, A New Look at Trade PolimJ Toward 
the Communist Bloc (Sub-committee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint 
Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, Doc. 76695, 1961) is a recent and useful 
reference, although Mr. Pisar's emphasis upon economic warfare is subordinate 
to broader considerations of trade policy. 
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in dollars or other convertible currency to provide the initial attrac-
tion. 
The Free World markets of the target area are restricted at the 
same time by selling the purchased products at a lo"\v price to 
customers of the target. Egyptian cotton, for example, has been 
sold by satellites belo"\v the "\vorld market price. 
As dependence upon Bloc trade in the target area increases, the 
Bloc offers long-term credits at low-interest rates and shifts trade 
to a barter basis. The use of credit probably stems from a desire to 
shift to barter rather than from a design to force the debtor into 
bankruptcy by insisting upon repayment at an awkward time. Yet 
the credit has coercive possibilities for future action by the Bloc. 
The size of the credit and its usual earmarking for "impact" 
projects generates publicity and conspicuously labels the benefit, 
such as an industrial plant or dam, as a contribution of the Bloc. 
Administration of the credit provides an opportunity to establish 
'vorking relationships "\vith key officials and influential organizations. 
As ties of the target area with the Free World are weakened, 
military assistance and grants in aid are commenced. Military as-
sistance permits the introduction of large numbers of technicians, 
infiltration of the policy making and security institutions of the 
area, and neutralization or communization of influential governing 
groups. 
Economic penetration by the Bloc commenced with the aid pro-
gram to Afghanistan in 1954. 'The program was extended to India, 
the U AR, Indonesia, Iraq, Ethiopia and Guinea. Technicians were 
provided for service in these countries and natives, both civilian 
and military, were received in Bloc schools. 
The Soviet Union, as of 1960, had extended credits or grants to 
Free World or "Uncommitted Countries" of approximately $3.1 
billion. The European satellites and Red China together had 
extended credits or grants of slightly over $1.0 billion, the aid 
extended by Red China being substantially larger than that of any 
European satellite. Although the credits have not been utilized 
fully, t"\venty-five Free World or "Uncommitted Countries" have 
received economic assistance from the Bloc. 
Bloc assistance may temporarily strengthen the economy of the 
country aided. This strength may become permanent. The Bloc 
program is too new to dra"\v hard and fast conclusions about it. But 
the ultimate effects of Bloc aid and trade may be to disturb the 
political stability of the area. 
Industrial plants and public "\vorks have been particularly favored 
as forms of Bloc aid. Public "\vorks, 'vith health and education 
services, are usually the forms of assistance most needed by under-
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developed states to lay the foundation for political stability. But 
premature industrialization of an underdeveloped state, lacking law 
and conduct patterns not readily geared to the problems of an 
industrialized society, may stimulate chaotic conditions in which 
Communist political doctrines and institutions can obtain a secure 
foothold. Such chaos, if it can be distinguished from the turbulence 
usually associated with the creation of a new state, cannot at this 
stage be said to have resulted from Bloc aid and trade. Nor has 
the economic orientation of any Free World or "Uncommitted 
Country," other than Cuba, been changed sufficiently to be used as 
a base for Soviet political control. 
Soviet tugs on the reins of states thought to have been "enveloped" 
economically, such as Yugoslavia, Egypt and Albania, have not 
produced the effects one might reasonably expect. The present danger 
to the Free World is the divisive effect of Soviet Bloc economic 
·warfare ·which stems from the high degree of flexibility and direc-
tion which Bloc economic policies have demonstrated. 
Although the Bloc suffers from a disadvantageous disparity in 
material resources, and has significant 'veaknesses of its o'vn, it has 
the advantage of ability to concentrate its economic power at points 
of ·weakness in the Free \Vorld. It also possesses organization which 
permits rapidity in decision and execution of policies. The Bloc 
is equipped to deliver economic sorties in addition to its slower 
technique of capture by economic accretion. 
The economic organization of the "free-enterprise" Free World, in 
which the United States is the mobilizing force, is by contrast 
keyed to a defensive policy in econo1nic warfare. The United 
States policy, furthermore, is one of defense by protracted harass-
ment of the opponent rather than of counterattack by "economic 
sortie." As Secretary of State Rusk, with specific reference to 
security controls, testified: 6 
* * * While our policy of control is a selective one and while 
we cannot expect to cripple Soviet Bloc economic or military 
power through an export control system, we can accomplish 
something useful if 've recognize that our objective must be a 
limited one. That objective is to delay_ the development of 
Soviet military capability in selected areas where a coordinated 
denial policy by Western suppliers may have an impact. We 
6 Investigation and Study of the Administration, Operation, and Enforcement 
of the Export Control Act of 191,9, and Related Acts. (Hearings before Select 
Committee on Export Control, House of Uepresentatives, U.S. Congress, Doc. 
77836, 1962) 69. 
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cannot hope to erect an absolute barrier to Soviet advancements 
in military production; we can make it more difficult or more 
time consuming for the Soviets to make certain kinds of prog-
ress. From this standpoint, the trade control operation is closely 
akin to the basic objective of our national defense policies-
namely, the preservation and if possible the widening of the 
margin of advantage in time wherever we enjoy it in military 
capability. It is this margin in ultimate military power which 
is the hope of the West in the near term, and whatever con-
tribution the trade control system has made to its maintenance 
is valuable. * * * 
2. The United States and the Free World: The Legal Response to 
Bloc Economic Warfare 
The basic laws by which the flow of trade . between the United 
States and foreign countries is controlled for political objectives are 
the Export Control Act of 1949 7 and the Trading With the Enemy 
Act of 1917.8 The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 
(Battle Act) 9 establishes the basis for the United States relation-
ship with the Free World system of voluntary controls over the 
export of strategic goods to the Soviet Bloc and relates this program 
of trade restriction to the foreign aid program of the United States. 
Other laws, such as the Johnson Act, 10 prohibiting private loans to 
countries in default in payment of their obligations to the United 
States, have some political relevance but are of less importance in 
economic warfare. 
Emport Oontrol Act of 191,1) 
The Export Control Act of 1949 is administered by the Secretary 
of Commerce pursuant to authority delegated by the President. 
~rhe Secretary of Commerce thus controls all exports except the 
following: Armaments, aircraft, special airborne equipment and 
7 63 Stat. 7 (1949) ; 50 U.S. Code App. 2021 et. seq. The act has been extended 
several times. 
s 40 Stat. 411 (1917); 50 U.S. Code App. 1 et. seq. 
9 65 Stat. 644 (1951). 
10 48 Stat. 57 4 ( 1934). Section 620 (c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
75 Stat. 424 (1961), prohibits assistance to the government of any country 
which is indebted to any United States citizen for goods or services furnished, 
when such citizen has exhausted available legal remedies and the debt is not 
denied or contested by such government. 
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helium, which are controlled by the Secretary of State; 11 atomic 
materials and facilities, controlled by the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion; 12 and narcotics 13 and gold, 14 controlled by the Treasury 
Department. 
Pursuant to po,vers delegated by the President under Section 
5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, the Secretary 
of the Treasury controls shipments of strategic commodities by 
foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations by the Foreign Assets 
Transaction Regulations 15 and the Transaction Control Regula-
tions.16 These regulations are enforced by action against the parent 
company in the United States. 
In Section 2 of the Export Control Act of 1949, the Congress 
expressed its policy to use export controls: 
* * * [T] o the extent necessary (a) to protect the domestic 
economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to 
reduce the inflationary impact of abnormal foreign demand; 
1168 Stat. 848 (1954), 72 Stat. 267 (1958) ; 22 U.S. Code 1934 et seq. The 
munitions list and licensing regulations appear in 22 CFR, Part 121 et seq. 
Imports as well as exports of munitions are controlled by the Department of 
State. Arms reduced to scrap, by being rendered useless beyond the possibility 
of restoration to their former identity, are licensable as scrap by the Depart-
ment of Commerce. lVlanufacturers, importers and exporters of the articles on 
the munitions list are required to register with the Secretary of State. Intransit 
licenses as well as export and import licenses are required. 
12 68 Stat. 936 (1954), 70 Stat. 1071 (1956), 72 Stat. 276 (1958) ; 42 U.S. Code 
2034 et seq. The controls over transactions in atomic rna terials are more 
stringent than any other since these materials are handled by the Atomic 
Energy Commission in a manner which amounts to a state-trading monoply. 
The exports controlled by the Commission are (a) source material, of which 
substantially none has ever been exported to the Soviet Bloc, (b) by-product 
material of which small medicinal quantities have been licensed for export, 
(c) special nuclear material, such as plutonium, which can only be exported by 
the Commission and is not subject to licensing and (d) facilities for producing 
and utilizing special nuclear materials, such as gaseous diffusion plants. 
Nuclear materials of a special character and production and utilization facili-
ties may be transferred only to nations or organization with which the United 
States has agreements for cooperation under the Atomic Energy Act. There are 
no such agreements with the Soviet Bloc but there is such an agreement with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency to which Bloc countries belong. These 
countries could obtain these items through the Agency, in which case Agency 
controls would apply to assure that the items were used only for peaceful 
purposes. No such case has arisen, Bloc countries being unwilling to accept the 
controls required by the Agency. 
13 21 U.S. Code 171 et seq~· 26 U.S. Code 2590, 3230 et seq. 
14 Gold Reserve Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 337 (1934), and 12 U.S. Code 95 a 
(section 5 (b) of tfie Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917). 
t5 31 CFR, Part 500. 
16 31 CFR, Part 505. 
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(b) to further the foreign policy of the United States and to 
aid in fulfilling its international responsibilities; and (c) to 
exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the stand-
point of their significance to national security. 
The Export Control Act has been used to control all commodities 
and technical data exported to other countries except Canada; to 
impose selective controls upon products shipped to the Soviet Bloc; 
and to embargo all shipments to Red China, North Korea, North 
Vietnam and other Communist controlled areas in the Far East. 
The Department maintains a "Positive List" of commodities and 
data considered critical to the military po·wer of the Soviet Bloc. 
Validated licenses for listed items are required for each trans-
action. For items not on this list, general licenses are issued. Gen-
eral licenses authorize conditional export to specified destinations 
\vithout the necessity of obtaining a special license for each export 
transaction. 
The activities of the Department of Commerce in export control 
are coordinated with · those of other departments and agencies 
through an Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP). 
Membership is on the Assistant Secretary or Deputy Assistant 
Secretary level. 
The Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Interior, State and 
Treasury, and the Federal Aviation Agency and National Aero-
nautical and Space Agency are represented. The Committee Chair-
man is the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International 
Affairs. 
Day-to-day coordination is provided by an Operating Committee 
\vith representatives from the Departments and Agencies participat-
ing in the Advisory Con1mittee plus observers from the Atomic 
Energy Commission and Office of Economic Planning. The Chair-
man of the Operating Committee is the Director of the Export 
Policy Staff of the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Inter-
national Programs in the Departlnent of Commerce. The Operating 
Committee meets on call or the members may consult informally. 
A third body, established by Executive Order, is the Export Con-
trol Review Board, consisting of the Secretaries of Commerce, 
State and Defense, with the first as Chairman. Policy matters are 
channeled through all three levels of decision. 
These policy matters include such things as additions to or 
deletions from the "positive list'~ and control problems affecting 
particular countries or areas. A question of granting or denying 
a particular license might or might not involve a broad policy 
1natter. A license, for example, would be considered in the Operating 
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Committee i:f a licensing officer was unable to determine readily 
:from the positive list that it should be denied or granted. I:f all 
members o:f the Operating Committee concur, the matter ends there, 
although i:f the license is approved, it must go to the Secretary 
o:f Commerce :for final approval. I:f a member o:f the Operating 
Committee dissents, the matter goes to the Advisory Committee 
on Export Policy (ACEP). 
The same procedure is :followed in the Advisory Committee. I:f 
a member o:f the Advisory Committee dissents, the matter is re-
vie·w,ed by the Export Control Review Board. Matters o:f great 
importance might be referred by the Board to the National Security 
Council or to the President. The Secretary o:f Commerce can make 
the final determination on the Export Control Review Board. In 
practice a unanimity rule has been :followed. 
The major sanction supporting the export licensing system is 
denial o:f an export license. This denial may be :for a short period 
or :for the duration o:f the Act. Notice and a hearing are required. 
Criminal sanctions are also provided but are difficult to apply 
because much o:f the evidence must come :from :foreign sources and 
is not readily obtainable. Customs officials can seize and condemn 
goods being exported or about to be exported in violation o:f the 
Act and a vessel carrying prohibited goods can be required to 
return to port and discharge unlicensed cargo. 
Information required to enforce the Act is obtained :from various 
sources, including United States Intelligence Agencies, Economic 
Defense Officers o:f the Foreign Service in posts overseas, and the 
F.B.I. The Department o:f Commerce also has its Commercial 
Intelligence Division. 
Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 
The controls over exports applied pursuant to the Export Con-
trol Act o:f 1949 can also be developed under the Trading With the 
Enemy Act o:f 1917. This Act is intended principally as a basis 
:for interdicting private communications between persons in the 
United States and an enemy or ally o:f an enemy during a war 
declared by the Congress. Section 5 (b) o:f this Act, added in 1933, 
confers broad powers upon the President in time o:f peace as well. 
To bring Section 5 (b) into operation, the President must declare 
an emergency. A declaration o:f a national emergency was made by 
the President in 1950 and is still in :force. The provisions o:f Section 
5 (b) thus continue to operate. 
The powers conferred upon the President by Section 5 (b) are: 
(1) Investigate, regulate or prohibit any transaction in :foreign 
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exchange, transfer of credit or payment between, by, through, or 
to any banking institution, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, 
melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or 
securities; and (2) Investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, 
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, 
transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation o:f, 
or dealing in, or exercising any right, power or privilege with 
respect to, any transaction involving any property in which any 
foreign country or national thereof has any interest. 
The President has delegated his powers under this section to the 
Secretary of the Treasury. As previously noted, transactions in gold 
are controlled pursuant in part to these provisions. 
Likewise foreign trade transactions in strategic commodities by 
foreign corporations effectively controlled by domestic corporations 
are subject to license under 5 (b) .17 Enforcement action is against 
the domestic corporation. The effective control may be through 
stock ownership or perhaps by patent licenses. Financial controls 
have been imposed pursuant to this Section to block assets of Red 
China, North Korea and their nationals in the United States and 
to impose controls upon imports originating from these countries.18 
Exceptions can be made by Treasury licenses, but the boycott on 
Red Chinese and North J{orean goods has been total. Section 5 (b) 
of the Trading With the Enemy Act is thus like an accordion which 
can be stretched or compressed as required to block imports or 
exports and control financial transactions as determined by the 
President. 
Battle Act 
The Battle Act is administered by the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs. The purpose of this statute is to deny 
strategic commodities to the Soviet Bloc by bringing pressure upon 
countries receiving any form of United States aid to embargo these 
items. The Battle Act lists are revised from time to time to take 
account of economic · and scientific progress within the Bloc. The 
latest revision was in 1960. 
11 The restricted transactions are described in 31 CFR 505.10 as " * * * mer-
chandise * * * included in the Positive~ List of Commodities set forth in 15 CFR 
Part 399 and * * * identified on that list by the letter "A" in the column headed 
'Commodity Lists' or is of a type the unauthorized exportation of which from 
the United States is prohibited by any of the several regulations referred to in 
15 CFR 370.4." These descriptions include only items of major strategic im-
portance. '.rhe Treasury restrictions change as the Positive List is modified. 
1s Transactions are also controlled in property in which either Egypt or the 
Suez Canal Company has an interest. 31 CFR, Part 510. 
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The critical features of the Act are : ( 1) selective controls such 
as those used in the Export Control Act of 1949; (2) termination 
of assistance to countries which ship interdicted items to the Bloc, 
(a) on a mandatory basis if the shipment is on Battle Act List "A," 
armaments, atomic materials, etc., and (b) on a discretionary basis 
if the shipment is of materials on Battle Act List "B," the President 
having authority not to terminate if he finds unusual circumstances 
indicating that curtailment of aid would be detrimental to the 
security of the United States; and ( 3) creation of an administrative 
ce:1ter to coordinate the controls of the United States with those of 
the remainder of the Free World. There have been no terminations 
of aid under the Battle Act, no items on List "A" having been 
shipped and the President having found unusual circumstances in 
shipments of items on List "B." 
Although the Act, no doubt, has deterred some Free World ship-
ments of strategic goods to the Soviet Bloc, its important effect has 
been the development of a coordinating center, the Economic Defense 
Advisory Committee (EDAC), paralleling in some respects the 
Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP) which functions in 
the administration of the Export Control Act of 1949. However, 
there is no special review board above EDAC. 
The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Ad-
ministrator of the Battle Act, serves as Chairman of EDAC. The 
Committee contains representatives of the Departments of Defense, 
Commerce and Treasury, the Atomic Energy Commission and 
Central Intelligence Agency, and other departments or agencies 
interested in particular questions subject to consideration. 
There is a subsidiary executive committee, dealing with questions 
not requiring resolution by EDAC as a whole, and two working 
groups. The first deals with international export control systems, 
and the second deals with enforcement and transshipment questions 
having an international aspect. 
EDAC is used to reach interdepartmental and agency agreement 
concerning inst:ructions to field representatives dealing with the 
international control system for strategic materials and to obtain 
advice on Battle Act questions. For example, questions concerning 
the licensing of transactions in strategic materials by foreign cor-
porations effectively controlled by domestic corporations are referred 
by the Treasury Department to EDAC for recommendation. 
International Control Structure for Strategic Trade 
The international control structure with which EDAC main-
tains liaison existed before passage of the Battle Act. This is the 
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Consultative Group ( CG), an in :formal voluntary organization o:£ 
fifteen Free World states, including the United States.19 
The Group has operating under it a permanent working com-
Inittee, described as the Coordinating Committee ( COCOM) when it 
deals with exports to the Soviet Union and the European satellites 
and CHINCOM when it deals with exports to Red China, North 
Korea and North Vietnam. The unanimity rule applied to all but 
procedural questions and the obligations o:f the fifteen participating 
states are moral only. 
Until 1957 a differential existed between embargoed items to the 
European Soviet Bloc and embargoed items to Red China. This was 
abandoned because o:f pressure by a number o:£ Consultative Group 
members.20 
There are currently two International Lists (IL). List I contains 
embargoed items. List IV is a "Watch" list o:£ items which are 
maintained under surveillance. Lists II and III (quantitative and 
surveillance control items) ·were abolished in 1959. 
A number o:£ supplementary controls are used. By the Import 
Certificate-Delivery Verification System (IC/DV) a Consultative 
Group state, before granting a license to export a controlled item, 
requires the exporting firm to present an import certificate, executed 
by the importing firm and certified by the state o:£ destination. The 
certificate states that the shipment is actually destined :for the state 
indicated and will not be diverted or reexported. The exporting 
country may also obtain a certificate o:£ delivery verification in 
which the importing state certifies that the goods were actually 
delivered to the destination licensed. 
Many o:£ the Consultative Group states also require Transit 
Authorization Certificates (TAO) :for goods originating in member 
states and on the embargo list passing through the territory o:f 
another member en route to the Soviet Bloc. The TAO is issued by 
19 Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, The Netherlands, Turkey, Uniteo 
Kingdom, United States. The system began with an Anglo-French list estab-
lished in 1949. Each cooperating country has its own national control list. All 
the NATO signatories except Iceland belong to the Consultative Group. 
2>0 On :May 18, 1951, the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended 
that every state apply an embargo on shipments to Red Chinese and North 
Korean areas of "arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy 
materials, petroleum," transportation resources, and items useful in arms pro-
duction. At one time a strategic embargo on these items was applied by 45 
states, but after the Korean Armistice in 1953 the restrictions were rapidly 
jettisoned. CHINCOM was formed within the Consultative Group during this 
period of general embargo upon items of military use. At one time approxi-
mately 200 more items were on the CHINCOl\1 list than on the COCOl\f list. 
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the state of export and submitted to the state of transit. Transaction 
controls, such as those maintained by the United States, are also 
maintained by several other Consultative Group states. Shipping 
and bunkering controls were imposed by members for several years 
to restrict commerce ·with Red China. 
The United States maintains a permanent delegation to COCOM-
CHINCOM which is directed by the .Department of State with the 
advice of EDAC. The International Lists are revised annually and 
the United States delegation participates in this revision. 
The tendency has been to reduce the number of embargoed items 
and to permit freer trade with the Soviet Bloc. This is due in part 
to the expanding industries of the European Consultative Group 
members and of Japan, the considerable dependence of these states 
upon foreign trade, and a shortage of foreign exchange by which 
supplies, particularly ra ·w materials, can be purchased in the West. 
These states now receive no economic aid and the Battle Act has 
not been invoked to press them towards more restrictive controls 
because this would involve a withdrawal of military aid only. In 
the words of Secretary Rusk: 21 
* * * The United States has consistently pressed for a some-
what more restrictive policy than most of the other members 
of COCOM ·would accept. We have had, therefore, to balance 
the advantages of maintaining the COCOM system in order 
that our influence might keep those restrictions as strong as 
possible, or letting the system disappear and finding that the 
COCOM controls might gradually ·wither away. * * * 
The Battle Act has been helpful in influencing the policies of 
states "\vhich are not members of the Consultative Group, although 
the Bloc trade with these states in goods of a strategic nature has 
been relatively small. 
The United States, consequently, has fallen back to a unilateral 
position with respect to its trade restrictions with the Soviet Bloc. 
The "Positive List" of the Department of Commerce is based only 
in part upon the International Lists and contains items which the 
International List does not embargo. A total embargo and boycott is 
maintained on trade "\vith Red China, North Korea and North 
Vietnam, although such restrictions are not imposed by the other 
Consultative Group states. 
Validated licenses rather than Transit Authorization Certificates 
21 Investigation and Study of the Administration, Operation, and Enforcement 
of the Export Control Act of 1949, and Related Acts (Hearings Before Select 
Committee on Export Control, House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 
Doc. 77836, 1961) , 73. 
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are required for the transit of goods for which validated export 
licenses are required. American petroleum companies are prohibited 
from bunkering any vessel bound to or from Communist Far 
Eastern ports or Macao ·without a Treasury license and a validated 
license from the Department of Commerce is required for bunker-
ing vessels or fueling aircraft which have called or will call at 
Far Eastern Communist ports within stated time periods.22 
Coordination of Aid Program and Trade Controls 
The aid program of the United States is coordinated with the 
program of trade control through EDAC. The Director of the 
International Cooperation Administration was at one time Ad-
ministrator of the Battle Act and participation in the work of 
EDAC by representatives of the Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID) created pursuant to the Act for International Develop-
ment of 1961 23 will no doubt occur. The Secretary of State is 
responsible under the Act for International Development for con-
tinuous supervision and general direction of the assistance programs 
which the Act authorizes and integrating these at home and abroad 
so the foreign pol icy of the United States is best served. 
Prior to the Act for International Development of 1961 and 
following World War II, the aid programs of the United States 
emphasized: ( 1) reconstruction of the economies of wartime allies 
(as in the Greek-Turkish aid program and the European Recovery 
Program) ; (2) increasing military defenses of Free World coun-
tries; and ( 3) encouraging the economic development of under-
developed countries, now usually described as ''less developed" 
countries. The Military Assistance Program and economic aid to 
support military defense efforts were the largest aid projects during 
the 1950's . 
. 22 See The Strategic Trade Control System, 1948-1956: Mutual Defense As-
sistance Control Act of 1951, Ninth Report to Congress (1957), 35-37; 15 CFR 
371.13(2) and 371.13(3) (b) (2). 
23 P.L. 87-195, Sept. 4, 1961; 75 Stat. 424 (1961), Part I (1961). The entire 
Act is described as the Mutual Security Act of 1961. Part II of the law has the 
short title, "International Peace and Security Act of 1961." The Agency for 
International Development, which administers Part I, was established by Ex. 
Or. 10973, 26 FR 10469 (1961). The Agency supersedes the International Co-
operation Administration and the Development Loan Fund. The functions of 
the Export-Import Bank relating to loans under section 104(e) of the Agricul-
tural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 454 ( 1954) ; 7 
U.S. Code 1961 et seq. (1954), often called "P. L. 480" have also been trans-
ferred to the Agency. While the functions of the Agency are more embracing 
than those of International Cooperation Administration, it continues as part of 
the Department of State, its Administrator having the status of an Under 
Secretary of State. 
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These programs are now superseded in importance by attention to 
the "less developed" countries-using development loans, grants 
and technical cooperation; encouraging private investment by Fed-
eral guaranties against inability to convert earnings to dollars, 
foreign expropriation or confiscation, and loss due to 'var, revolution 
and insurrection; financing private business surveys; encouraging 
research; and contributing to the work o£ International Organiza-
tions in "less developed'' countries. The Military Assistance program 
is continued, $1,700,000,000 being appropriated by the Congress to 
this purpose £or each o£ the fiscal years 1962 and 1963. The program 
is administered by the Department o£ Defense under the general 
negotiating and coordinating authority o£ the Secretary o£ State. 
The Foreign Aid program, apart £rom its military aspects, now 
seems aimed to achieve global environmental changes. The countries 
aided are permitted to formulate· their individual plans £or develop-
ment. They are given advice as to reforms; but each is encouraged 
to develop its o'vn image o£ a "free society." 
Unlike earlier programs, which were geared to Soviet Bloc 
political movements, the current aid trend seems to recognize the 
menace o£ Communist action but to divorce substantially the United 
States aid program £rom a pattern o£ response. As stated by the 
President's Task Force on Foreign Economic Assistance: 24 
It is important that the United States, in its desire to offset 
these dangers, not engage in a frantic competition to outbid the 
Bloc's offers o£ aid or seek to prevent countries £rom accepting 
aid that will help them. To react this way would involve us in 
waste, draw us into an undignified posture, and open us to the 
charge o£ not being sympathetic to the economic development o£ 
other countries except on our own political terms. The size and 
effectiveness o£ the Communist effort are reasons £or concern and 
self-examination but not alarm. They emphasize the need £or 
the United States to make its aid as effective as possible, timely, 
vigorous, and responsive to short-term as well as long-term con-
siderations. I£ we do these things and our actions are con-
tructive and politically 'vise, the aid coming £rom the Commnnist 
Bloc should not 'vorry us. The increasingly effective Bloc effort 
is a challenge and a reminder to the United States that it 
cannot afford to make anything less than a major effort, designed 
and administered in such a way as to achieve maximum results 
o£ the right kind. 
Broad and flexible authority is conferred upon the President in 
24 An Act for International Development, A Summary Presentation, June 1961 
(Department of State Publication 7205), 189. 
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the Acts for International Development and International Peace 
and Security, including authority to give certain kinds of aid sub-
ject to limitations in amounts despite the provisions of the Battle 
Act.25 There is also broad authority to give "supporting assistance" 26 
from a contingency fund; and authority to use $50,000,000 for the 
funds appropriated for purposes 'vhich he need not disclose upon 
certification.27 Action of a nature 'vhich 'vould not be disclosed might 
be taken in economic 'varfare by the Central Intelligence Agency 
or some similar executive institution. However, because of its gen-
eral object to secure massive environmental changes, the Aid 
structure does not seem to be readily adaptable for coordination 
with a program of trade restriction, even though EDAC is available 
for that purpose. 
Current Econo~mic Warfare Posture 
The present economic warfare posture of the United States is 
one of attempting to buy "lead time" by impeding the development 
of Soviet Bloc economies through use of a program of export and 
import controls. This "lead time" is used by subsidizing its scien-
tific development; improving the defensive capacity of its allies; 
and by a massive effort to change the environments of "less de-
veloped" and uncommitted countries. 
The idea that wealth might be used offensively, or might be care-
fully focused for political ends, seems not to have been entertained 
seriously in the program. Congress has retained much control 
over the trade control and aid programs by reporting requirements 
and investigations. This control perhaps has discouraged initiative 
in the offensive use of wealth in situations sensitive in domestic 
politics. 
It is unlikely that this United States defensive structure will 
undergo more than the slow mutations exhibited since World War 
II. Thus, any flexibility 'vhich can be developed to fend and return 
skillfully engineered Soviet Bloc "economic sorties~' will have to be 
derived from laws 'vhich have never been fully utilized. One of 
these is Section 5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917. 
Other treaties and domestic la ·ws remain to be explored by the 
responsible administrators. There ·will be a premium upon ingenuity 
and speed in administrative interpretation of existing laws. 
In the past decade of active political application by the Soviet 
Union and Bloc states of their increasing economic strength in 
foreign affairs, intervention by the Soviet Union in support of the 
2s P.L. 87-195, Sept. 4, 1961; 75 Stat. 424 (1961), section 614 a. 
26 I d., sections 401, 402, 451. 
27 I d., section 614 c. 
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Castro regime in Cuba demonstrates the purpose and skill with 
'vhich Bloc economic power can be brought to bear to support 
Communist political objectives. The case suggests also the im-
portance of administrative ingenuity and speed in the United States 
in utilizing hitherto unutilized laws in economic warfare. T he perils 
of defensive, cautious and 'veil-meaning economic policies when 
opposed to an aggressive, carefully aimed, and coordinated Com-
munist "economic sortie" are amply demonstrated. 
B. SUGAR ECONOMIES OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES : 
THE LEGAL MILIEU FOR WEALTH BALANCE 
The Cuban economy is based substantially upon the production 
and export of unrefined sugar. Cuba is the major sugar exporter and 
is second only to the Soviet Union as a sugar producer. In 1959, 
the first year of the Castro revolution, Cuba produced 6,577,000 
tons. Of this production, 3,437,582 tons, or slightly more than half, 
was exported to the United States. 
The United States is a closed sugar market. This means that 
both production of sugar within the United States and its posses-
sions and imports into these areas are limited. The limitations are 
to maintain the domestic sugar price and to develop dependable 
sources of supply. 
Sugar Act of 1948 
The production and marketing of sugar within the United States 
was regulated in 1959 by the Sugar Act of 1948.28 This Act 
originated as the Jones-Costigan Amendment to the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act,29 and was carried over as the Sugar Act of 1937 
when the Agricultural Adjustment Act was held unconstitutional by 
the United States Supreme Court. 
By the Sugar Act of 1948, as in force with amendments in 1959,30 
the Secretary of Agriculture determined in December of each year 
the probable sugar consumption in the United States for the year 
following. This tonnage 'vas then divided up among domestic and 
foreign producers in accordance with a quota system set forth in the 
statute. 
The statute established the basic need of the United States for 
sugar at 8,350,000 tons. Although the actual sugar consumption at 
28 61 Stat. 922 (1947). 
29 46 Stat. 670 (1934). 
30 Amendments at the end of 1961 appear in 65 Stat. 318 (1951) ; 70 Stat. 217 
(1956) ; 74 Stat. 330 (1960) ; and 75 Stat. 40 (1961). 
104 
the time the statute was passed \vas greater than this, and ever 
since has greatly exceeded this figure, domestic and import quotas 
\Vere computed in relation to this tonnage. 
A minimum quota :for domestic producers was established in 
the statute at 4,444,000 tons. This minimum quota was allotted 
among domestic beet producers ( 1,800,000), mainland cane pro-
ducers ( 500,000) and the remainder among cane producers in Hawaii, 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. To this minimum quota was 
added 55% o:f the amount by \vhich the probable sugar consumption 
as determined by the Secretary o:f Agriculture exceeded the "basic 
statutory" need o:f 8,350,000 tons. A quota o:f 952,000 tons was 
established :for the Republic o:f the Philippines. 
Cuba received 96% o:f the amount by which the basic statutory 
need o:f 8,350,000 tons (or a lesser amount determined by the 
Secretary as the actual probable consumption) exceeded the mini-
mum quota :for domestic producers ( 4,444,000) plus the quota :for 
the Philippines (952,000). Cuba also received 29.59% o:f the amount 
by which the actual probable consumption as determined by the 
Secretary exceeded the basic statutory need (8,350,000). This addi-
tional tonnage has always been substantial. 
A minimum Cuban quota \vas fixed at 28.6% o:f the total United 
States consumption estimated by the Secretary i:f this estimate was 
7,400,000 tons or less; and at 2,116,000 tons i:f the actual consump-
tion was estimated at more than 7,400,000 tons. The quota o:f do-
mestic producers was to be reduced pro rata to make up the mini-
mum Cuban quota, although the Cuban quota has always been well 
above 2,116,000 tons. 
Foreign producers, other than Cuba and the Philippines, received 
4% o:f the amount by \vhich the basic statutory need (8,350,000) 
exceeded the minimum quota :for domestic sugar producers plus 
the quota o:f the Philippines. This :foreign p:!:'oducer quota was 
prorated in accordance with a statutory scale. 
O:f the amount o:f probable consumption in excess o:f the basic 
statutory need ( 8,350,000) allocated to these less :favored :foreign 
producers, the Dominican Republic received 4.95%, Peru 4.33%, 
Mexico 5.10% and the remaining 1.03% \vas divided among other 
:foreign suppliers by a :formula lfased upon experience with their 
tonnage exported to the United States under earlier quota alloca-
tions. 
I:f a domestic producer or :foreign supplier :failed to fill its quota, 
the deficit \vas allocated among other quota holders. I:f a domestic 
producer or Cuba defaulted, the reallocation was made first to 
domestic producers. I:f they \Vould not fill the new quota, the 
allocation \vas to Cuba. I:f the Philippines :failed to fill its quota, 
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Cuba was allocated 96% of the deficit and the other foreign pro-
ducers received 4%. If any foreign producer other than the Philip-
pines failed to fill its quota, the entire deficit went to Cuba; and 
if Cuba could not fill the deficit, the Secretary could allocate it. 
Under the Sugar Act of 1948, Cuba thus enjoyed marketing 
privileges comparable to those of domestic producers. Sugar con-
sumption in the United States ·was rapidly increasing. Assuming 
continued controls upon the acreage of domestic producers, and 
no significant breakthroughs in methods of production, Cuba could 
reasonably expect an expanding and lucrative United States market. 
The United States 1narket had special appeal for all foreign sup-
pliers because of its high sugar price. By manipulating his estimates 
of probable annual consumption, the Secretary of Agriculture, 
although he could not control prices directly, nevertheless controlled 
them indirectly by increasing or decreasing domestic and import 
quotas, subject to the minimum quotas established. By this method, 
the Secretary maintained the United States price at about 2 cents 
per pound above the world market. 
While all foreign suppliers having quotas enjoyed this price 
advantage, Cuba also received a 20% tariff preference on sugar 
imported into the lJnited States. This preference was based on a 
treaty made in 1902.31 A tariff of 4/8 of a cent per pound was thus 
levied on Cuban sugar as compared with 5/8 of a cent per pound 
on the sugar of all other foreign suppliers except the Philippines.32 
In 1959, this privileged position of Cuban producers enabled them to 
make approximately $159,000,000 more upon that part of the crop 
sold in the United States than if the sales had been on the world 
market. 
The favored position of Cuba stemmed in part from recognition 
of historic patterns in the sugar trade and in part from the close 
friendship existing bet-\veen the t-wo countries. But the favored 
position of Cuba ·was founded also upon intensely practical con-
siderations. 
There were important business reasons for the Cuban preference. 
Cuba ·was a major consumer of United States exports. Approximately 
4/5ths of Cuba's visible imports came from the United States and 
31 33 Stat. 2163 (1903-5). 
32 By the Philippine Trade Act, 60 Stat. 141 (1946) the Philippine quota is 
set at 982,000 tons annually for the period 1 January 1946 through 3 July 1974. 
Until 3 July 1954 the sugar was admitted duty free. For the remainder of 1954 
the rate was 5% of the lowest rate charged another country. For 1955 the rate 
was 10% of the lowest rate charged any other country; and each year there-
after it is increased 5% until it reaches 100% on 1 January 1973. 
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were principally in machinery, motor vehicles, cotton manufactures, 
rice, wheat, flour and lard. The Cuban sugar preference supplied 
dollars which could be used to pay for these products. Investments 
by United States citizens in Cuba were greater than in any other 
country in the 1Vestern Hemisphere except Canada. These investors 
benefitted by Cuban trade 'vith the United States which in turn 
depended largely upon the sugar preference. 
United States nationals o1vned 36 out of the 116 mills producing 
ra\v sugar in Cuba. T he United States corporations owning these 
mills also o\vned much land upon 'vhich sugar cane was raised. 
The Atlantica del Golfo and Rionda Groups of American Sugar 
!fills held approximately 500,000 acres each. Cuban-American Sugar 
Company held 330,000 acres; and the United Fruit Company 226,000 
acres. A preference for Cuban sugar meant a preference directly for 
a substantial nun1ber of United States stockholders. 
There \Yere important strategic grounds for the Cuban preference. 
Communist influence had been present in Cuba from the early years 
of the Depression of 1929. Special privileges for Cuban sugar 
producers in the United States n1arket created jobs and established 
a wage level 'vhich \Yould not have been possible if all of Cuba's 
sugar production had been sold on the \Vorld market. 
Although the standard of living for most Cubans remained quite 
low, the standard \vas higher than in most of the rest of Latin 
America, and would have been lo,ver \Yithout the United States 
market preference. \Vith a decreasing standard of living, Cuba 
might have become increasingly vulnerable to Communist infiltra-
tion, although the pattern of Communist conquest has since suggested 
that its major appeal is to educated groups 'vith a relatively high 
living standard. 
In addition to its familiar use as food, sugar is also used in the 
manufacture of plastics, drugs, antifreeze, synthetic rubber, ethyl 
alcohol and numerous other products important in national defense. 
About one acre of cane produces the ethyl alcohol needed to man-
ufacture smokeless po,vder sufficient to propel fifteen five-inch shells. 
Cuba has supplied about 11:3 of the total sugar needed for food 
and manufacturing in the United States and has done this at stable 
prices during periods of international crisis. The geographic posi-
tion of Cuba simplifies the protection of cargo vessels transporting 
sugar to the United States. Shipping costs and insurance rates 
during \vartime tend to be lo,ver. Cuba was a relatively secure and 
dependable source of sugar and the United States was anxious to 
encourage and protect its reliable foreign supplier. 
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World Sugar 11! arket 
The bulk of the ·world sugar production is sold in closed markets 
such as in the United States under the Sugar Act of 1948. The most 
important of these are created by the British Common·wealth and 
French Agreements, although the sugar sales by Cuba in these 
markets ·would under any circumstances be less than in the United 
States. The trade bet-ween the Soviet Union and its satellites has 
so1ne of the characteristics of a closed market since this trade is in 
barter or in nonconvertible currencies. For this reason trade in a 
Bloc market is not desirable for a country ·which expects to purchase 
Western goods. 
Only about 10% to 15% of the 'vorld sugar production is sold in 
the "world" or "free" market, although it was here that much of 
the Cuban sugar production ·was marketed. Sugar prices in the 
free market tend to be both low and erratic. 
The depressed free market price is caused by chronic overproduc-
tion of sugar. "'\Vorld sugar production was 64,625,000 tons in 1959. 
Of this, 7,494,000 "\vas thrown on the free market, although there was 
a free-market sale of only 6,283,000 tons. 
For the ten years bet,veen 1950 and 1960, ·world sugar consump-
tion increased at about 5% per annum. World sugar production 
increased at about 10% per annum. Per capita sugar consumption 
is low in many countries-about three pounds per capita in Red 
China as compared 'vith one hundred and one pounds per capita 
in the United States. This low consumption in the "under" or "less" 
developed countries may increase. A parallel increase in sugar 
production is also forecast. Ho,vever, the supply is likely to co.p.-
tinue to exceed the amount marketable. A number of countries, 
such as West Germany and India, "\Vere finding it difficult to market 
their sugar surpluses in 1961, although they had experienced no 
major marketing difficulty in previous years. 
The erratic prices on the free market are due principally to 
weather and "\Vorld tension. A prolonged drought in Eastern Europe 
in 1960 raised the price of beet sugar on the free market by reducing 
the supply. 
When the Batista government was overthrown in 1959, the free-
market price of sugar "\Vas 3.67 cents per pound. This unusually 
high price for the free market resulted from the threat to the 
Cuban supply from Castro's burning of cane fields. The price 
dropped to 3.1 cents per pound in February 1959, \vhen the Cuban 
supply was thought assured by Batista's overthrow. 
In World Wars I and II, the l{orean War and the Suez Crisis, 
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the :free-market price jumped appreciably. The price declined with 
alacrity when tensions were reduced. 
Because o:£ fluctuations in the :free-market price, attempts have 
been made to attain price stability by a series o:£ multilateral 
treaties. Cuba and the United States have joined in all since the 
first treaty in 1937. 
The International Sugar Agreement in :force in 1959 33 permits 
an International Sugar Council to set export quotas in the :free 
market. These quotas may be above or belo·w a basic tonnage :for 
exporting countries ·which the Agreement specifies. 
A minimum desired :free-market price is set at 3.25 cents per 
pound. I:£ the price on the :free market dips belo\v this :for seventeen 
successive business days, the Council is required to cut export quotas 
by 21j2 % and is permitted to cut quotas by 10%. I:£ the price :falls 
below 3.15 cents per pound, the Council may cut export quotas up 
to 20%. This is the maximum cut permitted. Exporting countries 
(such as Cuba) agree to limit production and exports; and import-
ing countries (such as the United States) agree to restrict imports 
:from nonparticipating sources. All important sugar producers, \vith 
the exception o:£ Red China, are parties to the Agreement. 
The Sugar Council meets periodically to consider quotas. Voting 
in the Council is \Veighted. One thousand votes are allocated to 
sugar exporters (including Cuba) and 1,000 votes to sugar im-
porters (including the United States). The number o:£ votes allocated 
to each participating country differ. As importers, the United States 
and the United Kingdom each have 245 votes as compared to 10 
votes :for Ghana. Cuba has 245 votes as a sugar exporter, compared 
with 95 votes :for the Soviet Union and 10 votes :for Haiti. 
Provisions are liberal :for \vithdra\ving :from the Agreement after 
notice by the ·withdra\ving party. Cuba, :for practical purposes, is 
an essential party to the Agreement. Without Cuban participation 
the :free-market price would be unduly difficult to stabilize. 
Cuba has the largest :free-market quota. This is 2,415,000 tons, 
subject to reconsideration in 1962.34 So long as Cuba desires to sell 
sugar on the :free market, it is probably in her interest to remain a 
party to the Agreement. If Cuba desires to withdraw from the 
Agreement and depress the \Yorld price by dumping her marketable 
sugar, there is no \Yay in \vhich this \vithdrawal can be prevented. 
But dumping her marketable sugar on the 1narket without a :£or1nal 
3310 U.S. Treaties 2189. 
34 The Cuban quota was actually reconsidered in December 1961 on a special 
Cuban request for a quota increase to cover its sales to the Soviet Union. There 
being no agreement on this increase in the Council, the Sugar Agreement ap-
peared on the verge of co11apse. 
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'vithdrawal from the Agreement pursuant to its terms would place 
Cuba in violation of a treaty obligation. 
Since 1959, the free-market price has tended to fluctuate below 3 
cents per pound. Under these circumstances, parties to the Agree-
ment may take unilateral action to limit exports. Cuba, in 1960, set 
3.25 cents per pound as the price for Cuban sugar on the free market 
and the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute made substantial pur-
chases to reduce the amount available :for export. Because the cost 
of production of raw sugar in Cuba was approximately 4 cents per 
pound in 1959 and 1960 and the free-market price was substantially 
below this, the 2 cents per pound premium which Cuban sugar 
brought in the closed United States market ·was essential to make 
production profitable. 
C. CUBAN-COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AND THE 
RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1959 AND 
EARLY 1960 
Despite the clear dependence o:f the Cuban sugar industry upon 
the closed market of the United States, the difficulties involved in 
diversifying agriculture and developing new industries in Cuba, and 
the evident interest of the United States in continuing Cuban sugar 
pre:ferences, the Castro regime, sparked by its Communist elements, 
began a hostile campaign against the United States early in 1959. 
'This campaign was designed ultimately to disrupt relations bet,veen 
the United States and Cuba, neutralize the power o:£ Cuban mod-
erates, and pave the 'vay :for Cuban entrance into the Soviet Bloc. 
Pending the purge of moderate adherents to the regime and 
liquidation o:£ the Cuban political opposition, and until a mini-
mum program o:£ Soviet economic assistance to Cuba could be 
developed, it 'vas important .to Castro that Cuban pre:ferences in 
the United States sugar market be preserved. The pre:ferences were, 
however, regarded as a fulcrum for political leverage by the United 
States and thus incompatible with the radical reorientation planned 
for Cuban political relations. The preferences 'vere desired by Cuba 
only as an interim device to develop foreign exchange. Cuban hold-
ings of foreign exchange were low due to withdrawals by Batista 
officials. These holdings 'vere further diminished by the inept man-
agement of the Castro government. 
Castro thus had to deal with a delicate problem o:£ balance-
disturbing relations with the United States sufficiently to justify 
his Communization of the Cuban government and liquidation of the 
labor unions and other potential sources o:£ opposition while at the 
same time keeping the Cuban sugar quota as long as possible to tide 
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him over the thin years which the revelation of his Communist ties 
would probably bring. 
The Castro regime accordingly commenced an economic offensive. 
This was designed to disturb the psychical equilibria of officials in 
the United States and delay the response of the Administration 
as the Communist ties of the regime received publicity. 
Cuban representatives contended, first, that the Cuban sugar quota 
should be removed from the Act of 1948 and incorporated into a 
ne'v bilateral treaty bet,veen Cuba and the United States. The 
ostensible purpose of this move was to prevent fluctuations in the 
Cuban quota by removing it from the influence of domestic politics. 
The actual purpose ·was to develop an international legal argu-
ment to assert to forestall future disciplinary cuts in the quota. 
Restoration of the Cuban sugar preferences as these existed 
before 1956 was also sought. The Sugar Act of 1948 had been 
amended in 1956 to limit Cuba's "deficit quota'~ to 29.6% of the 
excess above the basic 8,350,000 tons; 96% of this excess had been 
allocated to Cuba prior to 1956. While Cuba sold more sugar in 
the United States after 1956 than before, this increased sale had 
been due to an increased United States consumption. A return to 
the earlier formula 'vould greatly increase Cuban sugar sales 
during 1960. 
These demands by the Castro regime fell upon deaf ears both in 
the Administration and in Congress. Concern as to the nature and 
direction of the Castro movement had been stimulated during the 
late 'vinter and early spring of 1959. Earlier hopes for moderation 
by Castro as the heat of victory subsided, 'vere salted 'vith pro-
found skepticism concerning his personal qualities as a leader and 
uncertainty concerning the political orientation of many of his 
principal advisers. 
Faced with this gradual loss of sympathy and confidence, and 
'vith the negative response to his efforts to secure guarantees of 
the sugar quota during 1960, Castro announced his Agrarian Reform 
Law. Agrarian reform had been an objective of the Castro revolution 
and changes in the Cuban landholding system 'vere clearly needed. 
This Ia,v, ho,vever, "~as aimed principally at the holdings of Amer-
. . 1can sugar companies. 
Its terms and timing, by suspending a s,vord of Damocles over 
the ownership of American properties in Cuba, were designed to 
force a continuation of the sugar preferences at least through the 
marketing season of 1960. The administrative discretion and flexi-
bility derived from the vague provisions of the law permitted in-
definite postponement of action to expropriate the American prop-
erties. 
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The Castro regime could thus publish the law but announce that 
no action ·would be taken under it until the close of the 1960 market-
ing season. The Sugar Act of 1948 ·was required by its terms to be 
reviewed in 1960. The threat of expropriation, coupled with the hope 
instilled in the corporate stockholders that Castro might be made to 
"see the light," might make Congress reluctant to cut or eliminate 
the Cuban quota despite the development of closer ties between 
Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. 
The essential elements of the Reform Law were severance of cane 
grinding from cane production and restriction of ownership of 
grinding mills either to Cuban nationals or to corporations totally 
owned by Cuban nationals. Land o·wnership was limited to 1,000 
acres per person or corporation. No cane land could be sold to a 
foreign national. Ninety days "\vere allowed to convert the stock in 
mill corporations to Cuban ownership. 
Compensation for the expropriated property was to be in 4% 
Cuban bonds payable in 30 years. The basis of compensation was to 
be the tax value of the land prior to 10 October 1958. In 1958 the 
assessed tax value had been a small fraction of the market value. 
After the Reform Law '"Tas published, the market value of cane 
land promptly dropped from $16,800 per hundred acres to $7,800 
per hundred acres. 
Coupled with the threat by the Castro regime, intended to in-
fluence United States domestic commercial interests, 140,000 United 
States stockholders being affected by seizure of the sugar properties, 
were restrictions placed upon imports from the United States into 
Cuba. These restrictions had the dual object of lessening the outflow 
of foreign exchange from Cuba and bringing home to American 
exporters the importance of the Cuban market. 
These efforts by the Castro regime to influence domestic com-
mercial interests and opinion generally in the United States raised 
questions concerning Cuba's obligations pursuant to Articles 15 
and 16 of the Charter of the Organization of American States. These 
Articles state : 
Article 15: No state, or group of states, has the right to 
intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever in 
the internal or external affairs of any other state. The foregoing 
principle prohibits not only armed force, but also any other 
form of interference or attempted threat against the personality 
of the state or against its political, economical and cultural ele-
ments. 
Article 16: No state may use or encourage the use of coercive 
measures of an economic or political character in order to 
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force the ·will of another state and obtain from it advantages 
of any kind. 
While it is doubtful this action by the Castro regime was of an 
intensity constituting a violation of Article 16 of the Charter, the 
various measures in their timing and administration seemed de-
signed to force the ""'ills of men1bers of the Executive Branch and 
Congress. The measures 'vere only partly bona fide agricultural 
reforms and limitations upon the outflo,v of foreign exchange. 
Ouban Sugar Situation in 1959 and 1960 
During 1959, despite a 20% cut in the free-market quota by the 
Sugar Council, the price dropped to 2.55 cents per pound. The 
Soviet Union purchased 500,000 tons of Cuban sugar in 1959. How-
ever, this purchase 'vas at the free-1narket price and substantially 
below the cost of production. 
Although a backlog of 1,000,000 tons 'vould probably be carried 
over by Cuba from 1959 into 1960, the prospect for production 
during 1960 'vas poor. Faced ,vith possible expropriation of their 
mills and land, the sugar operators 'vere reluctant to make the major 
repairs necessary for the 1960 grinding season. Banks 'vere unwilling 
to lend to the s1naller producers. The "rages for many laborers in 
1959 were unpaid. Labor unions, 'vhich had accepted a moratorium 
on wage increases during 1959, 'vere preparing to make new claims 
during 1960. Counterrevolutionary activity, including sabotage of 
sugar mills and burning of cane fields, 'vas commencing in Las 
Villas and Oriente Provinces. Refugees from the Castro tyranny 
were organizing throughout the Caribbean. 
These domestic problems 'vith 'vhich Castro grappled increased 
slightly the free-market price of sugar. But the tables could be 
quickly turned. The sugar 'vhich Cuba probably could produce in 
1960 plus the carry-over from 1959 would be channelled into the 
United States quota for 1960. This was estimated tentatively by 
the Secretary of Agriculture at 3,119,655 tons. 
Ii this quota ""'as quickly reduced in 1959 or early 1960, the 
rejected tonnage 'vould be thro,vn into the free market. This would 
force down the free-market price and the price 'vould quite probably 
remain low 'vith the prospect of the entire Cuban supply being 
marketed in a competitive pricing system. 
Cuba might or might not gd to the International Sugar Council 
to seek an increase in her free-market quota. If sufficient sugar was 
produced in 1960 to require this increase and the consent of the 
Sugar Council could not be obtained, the unsold surplus would have 
to be carried over into 1961; sold in a ne'v n1arket, such as Red 
China, from 'vhich little foreign exchange could be obtained; sold 
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in the free market in violation of the Sugar Agreement; or sold in 
the British or French markets. Neither England nor France might 
agree to these imports. Sugar sales \vould not be profitable in any 
event unless the sugar entered a closed market providing a price 
premium. 
A Possible Defen.•rive Scheme for the United States 
Employing Economic Sortie Techniques 
The most effective economic defense which the United States 
could have mounted against the Castro regime in 1959 or early 
1960 would have been aimed to disturb the psychical equilibria of 
key members of the regime elite. 
First, the plan to curtail or eliminate the sugar quota should be 
promptly disclosed. Castro should be notified explicitly what was 
desired in return for continuation of the quota. Second, if Castro 
did not respond promptly to this notification, withdrawal of the 
quota should be executed rapidly. Coupled with this withdrawal 
should be a clear commitment that the quota would be restored if 
Castro met the terms proposed. Third, the quota should be re-
stored if Castro met the terms. 
To achieve the most intense economic impact upon the Castro 
regime, manipulation of the sugar quota should be supported by 
simultaneous economic action of other types. Thus, an embargo, 
boycott and financial controls should be imposed upon Cuban trans-
actions under Section 5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 
1917.35 These measures should be hinged upon the same conditions 
prescribed for restoration of the sugar quota. 
A partial embargo, in fact, was imposed in October 1960, under 
the Export Control Act of 1949. This embargo covered all materials 
except nonsubsidized foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies.36 
But the embargo came too late for its pressure to be coordinated 
with that of withdraw·a] of the sugar quota. 
The action suggested would have invited grave risks in 1959 and 
early 1960. Castro might not respond by agreeing to negotiate out-
standing differences bet,veen Cuba and the United States or by 
conceding other points pressed by the Administration. He might, as 
he later did, ~ommence a general confiscation of American assets 
and patently cast his lot with the Soviet Bloc. 
If these further actions were taken by the Castro regime, the 
United States should be prepared to move for joint economic sane-
35 See Fn. 8, supra, and discussion of the provisions of Section 5 (b) in the 
related text. 
aa 25 Federal Register 8638 (1960). 
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tions imposed by the Organization of American States. Action should 
be taken to preserve the status quo pending a decision by that 
Organization. This action should probably be, for greatest effective-
ness, a naval blockade or quarantine of Cuban ports. Justification 
could be offered for such a blockade or quarantine based upon its 
basically defensive nature and upon its international administrative 
function as a stat~ts q'Uo maintaining device. Maintaining the stat'US 
q'Uo politically would give the Organization time for mature con-
sideration of the issues and increase the effectiveness of military 
or economic measures it employed. 
The scheme of action here suggested 'vas not followed by the 
United States in meeting the Castro economic sortie. While percep· 
tive moderate advisers of Castro remained in 1959 and early 1960, 
a defensive economic sortie might have influenced Cuban policy in 
a direction desired by the United States. 
As the United States delayed its responsive action, in part due to 
legal problems in organizing its defense, the structure of the Castro 
power elite began to change. Members of the elite who could make 
the required decisions became difficult to identify. 
An effective defensive economic sortie at this later stage would 
have imposed a heavy intelligence burden and would have required 
a period of intense psychological preparation of the target elite. 
The United States consequently fell into a posture of protracted 
harassment in economic warfare with Cuba; and due in part to 
intervention by the Soviet Union became locked in this position. 
Problems created by protracted harassment have been discussed 
in Chapter I. What were the reasons for this delay of the United 
States in organizing its economic defense? 
D. DIFFICULTIES IN ORGANIZING THE UNITED STATES 
DEFENSIVE POSITION 
Lack of Economic Warfare Professionals 
Apart from the very evident good faith with which the United 
States commenced relations with Castro Cuba, the major reason 
why no prompt response was made to the Castro economic sortie 
lies in the absence of a corps of specialists in economic warfare 
within the Administration to advise the President. 
Had the Castro regime launched a military attack upon the 
United States, this action could have been met promptly and effec-
tively by professional specialists in military violence. There were 
no specialists in economic violence. This fact invited the Castro 
regime to launch its economic sortie. 
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The foreign economic program of the United States was geared 
to developing scientific "lead-tilne," buttressing military defenses, 
and altering the environments of underdeveloped countries. The 
domestic economic program \Vas geared to evolution of a dyna1nic 
and growing industrial, investment and employment structure. 
Persons associated with these programs had not developed perspec-
tives enabling them to advise an economic sortie designed to obtain 
a decision or pattern of decisions from key members of an adversary 
power elite. The roots of the difficulty reached back to the abandon-
ment of economic violence following 1Vorld War II and the con-
cepts of foreign assistance which developed in its aftermath. 
Various persons in the United States during 1959 suggested the 
Cuban sugar quota be cut or eliminated, the Cuban premium of 2 
cents per pound on the United States market be abandoned, or the 
tariff preference for Cuba be jettisoned. The Administration never-
theless proceeded cautiously. This caution seems to be justified in 
view of the facts and law as members of the Administration per-
ceived these at the time. 
Intelligence Problem 
Although Soviet Bloc control of the Castro regime now appears 
to have been extensive before and after the Castro success in 1959, 
this was not equally clear in 1959 and early 1960. The actual state 
of United States intelligence upon this point will not be publicized. 
However, it is probably accurate to assume that either little was 
known at the time concerning the extent of Communist control or, 
if there was information upon the point, the facts were in much 
conflict. 
International Legal Considerations 
The Administration was anxious to conform to the requirements 
of international law in its dealings with the Castro regime, had a 
sincere desire to preserve amicable relations between the countries, 
and hoped to avoid needless injury to the Cuban people. 
During the heated debates in Congress in 1960 concerning the 
Cuban sugar quofa, Secretary of State Herter carried with him 
constantly Articles 15 and 16 of the Charter of the Organization of 
American States typed on a filing card so he could refer instantly 
to them in his discussions \vith members of the Congress.37 Article 
16, mentioned previously, forbade a state to use "coercive Ieeasures 
of an economic nature to force the will of another state and obtain 
from it advantages of any kind." 
87 Reston, New York Times, 1 July 1960, p. 24, col. 3. 
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The Administration was also concerned that action o£ the United 
States be consistent with the purposes and principles set forth in 
Articles I and II o£ the United Nations Charter. Although no 
provisions o£ the Charter expressly obligated the United States 
to refrain £rom economic action against a member o£ the Organiza-
tion, there was a requirement that members o£ the Organization 
settle their international disputes by "peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered." This might be used to support an argument that the 
United States "endangered peace or security" or "denied justice" 
by terminating an economic privilege upon which Cuba relied. 
A more direct difficulty \vas presented by the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a multilateral executive agreement, 
to which the United States and Cuba are parties.38 As an executive 
agreement on the part o£ the United States, GATT has the obliga-
tory effect o£ a treaty. GATT posed difficulties which might be 
encountered both in reducing the sugar quota and in eliminating 
the Cuban tariff preference on sugar, each being moves urged upon 
the Administration. 
By Article XI o£ GATT, no prohibition or restriction, other 
than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through 
quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be placed 
on the imports £rom or exports to any other contracting party. 
Restrictions upon imports o£ agricultural products are excepted 
£rom application o£ the Article when these restrict]ons support 
enforcement o£ domestic restrictions upon like products. N everthe-
less, any such restrictions must not reduce the total o£ imports 
relative to the total domestic production, as compared with the 
proportion which reasonably might be expected to rule between the 
two in the absence o£ restr]ctions. 
The Article is intended to accommodate a quota system, such 
as that used by the l Tnited States to control imports and production 
o£ sugar; but the Article is intended also to preserve the normal 
pattern o£ all imports o£ sugar as against all domestic production 
o£ sugar. I£ the United States eliminated the Cuban sugar quota 
as 61 Stat. A5 (1947). GATT originated from tariff negotiations at the Geneva 
Conference of 1947 while the Havana Charter was in process of drafting. The 
Havana Charter and the International Trade Organization to be established 
under it failed because of the decision of the President not to submit the Char-
ter to the Senate. Other states were unwilling to participate without the United 
States. GATT, however, has served as a point for institutional growth of the 
demands expressed in part in the Havana Charter, although the scope of GATT 
is much narrower. The most comprehensive text concerning GATT is V. A. 
Seyid Muhammad, The Legal Framework of World Trade (1958). 
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and, in its distribution o£ the deficit, showed preference to domestic 
producers, thereby altering the pattern o£ domestic production 
vis-a-vis imports, the United States might violate the Agreement. 
By Article XIII o£ GATT, no prohibition or restriction shall be 
placed by any contracting party upon imports or expor ts o£ any 
other contracting party unless the prohibitions and restrictions are 
like,vise applied to all third countries importing or exporting like 
products. Paragraph 2 o£ this Article states in part: 
In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting 
parties shall aim at a distribution o£ trade in such produce 
approaching as closely as possible to the shares 'vhich the 
various contracting parties might be expected to obtain in the 
absence o£ such restrictions, and to this end shall observe the 
following provisions: * * * 
(d) In cases in ,vhich a quota is allocated among supplying 
countries, the contracting party applying the restrictions may 
seek agreement 'vith respect to the allocation o£ shares in the 
quota 'vith all other contracting parties having a substantial 
interest in supplying the produce concerned. In cases in which 
this method is not reasonably practicable, the contracting 
party concerned shall allot to contracting parties having a 
substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon 
the proportions, supplied by such contracting parties during 
a previous representative period, o£ the total quantity or value 
o£ imports o£ the product, due account being taken of any 
special £actors which may have affected or may be affecting the 
trade in the product. No conditions or formalities shall be im-
posed which would prevent any contracting party £rom utilizing 
fully the share o£ any such total quantity or value which has 
been allotted to it, subject to importation being made within 
any prescribed period to 'vhich the quota may relate. * * * 
An argument may be made under Article XIII that the Cuban 
quota could not be eliminated by the United States unless the 
quotas o£ other foreign suppliers who were parties to the Agree-
ment were eliminated; that Cuba -was entitled to a quota~ based 
upon historic trade patterns; and that entry duties to compensate 
£or the American market premium should not be imposed to reduce 
the value o£ the quota to Cuba. 
By Article XXI o£ GATT, a contracting party may take any 
action which it considers necessary £or the protection o£ its essential 
security interests i£, among other circumstances, "taken in time o£ 
·war or other emergency o£ international relations." Escape £rom the 
restrictions o£ GATT 'vould thus require ability to argue either 
that a "war'~ or "an emergency o£ international relations" existed. 
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An emergency of the type contemplated by the Agreement possibly 
could not have been urged convincingly in 1959 or early 1960. 
The Cuban-American tariff preferences are expressly excluded 
from the general "most favored nation" treatment of customs duties 
and charges set forth in Article I of GATT. These preferences were 
continued in a separate "Exclusive Agreement" between the United 
States and Cuba.39 Although supplementary to GATT, the Exclusive 
Agreement is not a part of it. 
The Exclusive Agreement ·was a potential impediment to man-
ipulating the Cuban tariff preference. This was one of the measures 
proposed to the Administration. The Agreement contained no 
provision for termination other than withdrawal of either Cuba 
or the United States from GATT. Under the Protocol of Provisional 
Application of GATT, 'vhich re1nains operative, any party to the 
Agreement can withdraw by giving 60 days' notice. This satisfies 
the requirement of a termination provision in trade agreements made 
in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.40 
But unless either Cuba or the United States was prepared to 
'vithdra'v from GATT, the only other mode of termination would 
be by mutual agree1nent. A United States 'vithdrawal from GATT 
would forfeit the tariff and trade privileges which this Agree-
ment confers. This would be a heavy price to pay in order to man-
ipulate the Cuban tariff. 
The Exclusive Agreement 'vas not subject to the important 
security exception set forth in Article XXI of GATT. Furthermore, 
even if the Exclusive Agreement ·was terminated, other agreements 
came into operation which contained statements of termination 
time and would delay the tariff manipulation. 
The Exclusive Agreement suspends operation of the Reciprocity 
Convention bet,veen the United States and Cuba of 1902 41 and the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreement between the ~United States and Cuba 
of 1934.42 
The Reciprocity Convention conferred the 20% tariff preference 
upon Cuban products. Article XI of this Convention contains a 
termination provision one year after notice by either party. 
The Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934 suspends the Reciprocity 
Convention, continues the 20% preference, and provides for termina-
39 61 Stat. 3700 (1947). 
oro 48 Stat. 943 (1934), Section 2 (b). The trade agreements must be subject to 
termination not more than three years after the time the trade agreement comes 
into force; and if not then terminated, shall be terminable on not more than 
six month:-;' notice. 
4133 Stat. 2163 (1903-5). 
42 49 Stat. 3559 (1935-6). 
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tion upon six months' notice. An exchange of letters between the 
heads of the United States and Cuban delegations after the Exclusive 
Agreement was made clarifies the point that the United States can 
terminate either the Reciprocal Trade Agreement or the Reciprocity 
Convention while the Exclusive Agreement is in force.43 But the 
time limitations in the earlier agreements still apply. 
Thus, pursuant to the exchange of letters, the United States can 
give notice of its intention to withdraw from GATT (60 days), 
thereby negating the Exclusive Agreement, and notice of its inten-
tion to terminate the Reciprocal Agreement and Reciprocity Con-
vention. The time limit of the Reciprocity Convention ( 1 year) 
would be the time which must expire before the tariff could be 
manipulated. 
Threat to American Assets 
In addition to the international legal complications which action 
pertaining to Cuba potentially invited, approximately a billion 
dollars in American assets were at stake. It was amply clear from 
enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law and from the preparedness 
of the Castro regime to make ad hoc changes in the Cuban Ia ws, 
that a campaign against American property would commence if 
the Cuban sugar quota was reduced or eliminated. 
Import restrictions applied by Cuba to American products would 
damage exporters of machinery and textiles and producers of 
wheat, rice and lard, all of these items having been in heavy demand 
in the Cuban market. If the Administration proceeded to "wield 
the axe" without the participation of Congress, the reaction from 
the economic losses suffered by voters might be reflected in the 
alignment of votes in the approaching elections. 
Domestic Legal Problems 
While the President probably possessed emergency powers to 
block imports of Cuban sugar and perhaps take other action, such 
po,vers being implied from his authority as Commander in Chief 
and from his responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, the 
scope of these implied powers was not beyond debate. The existing 
statutes under which he might act also required findings of fact 
which would be difficult to make or required action of a more 
precipitate nature than the Administration was prepared to take 
unilaterally in view of the approaching election. The latter was 
probably the reason for the hesitancy of the Administration in 
invoking the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, although 
43 61 Stat. 3705 (1947). 
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invoking this Act might also lead to action in the Organization 
of American States in which the Administration did not appear 
ready to proceed. 
Pursuant to the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951,44 
the President can terminate a customs preference or end a quota of 
"any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign govern-
ment or foreign organization controlling the world Communist 
movement." In early 1960, action under this statute would require 
a determination by the President that Cuba was Communist con-
trolled. This determination might be difficult to support in view 
of the intelligence apparently available. 
Under the Tariff Act the President can impose additional duties 
not to exceed 50% ad /valorem of the property concerned or forbid 
the importation of property when a foreign country discriminates 
in fact by law or administrative regulation against the commerce 
of the United States. The President must find the public interest 
will be served.45 
Although there had been some discrimination against United 
States commerce at this time, there had not been a great deal. The 
position of the Castro regime concerning United States commerce 
had been limited to extravagant threats of action. 
Action under either the Trade Agreements Extension Act or the 
Tariff Act might support an argument that the United States had 
breached a current executive agreement, such as GATT. Determina-
tion when the facts were still equivocal of either Communist con-
trol of Cuba or discriminations against United States commerce 
might damage the moral position of the United States, especially 
in the Organization of American States. 
Unilateral action by the United States against Cuba might 
solidify the impression in Latin America, assiduously cultivated by 
Castro, that Cuban-American difficulties were derived from an 
effort by the United States to "retain" Cuba in "economic bondage." 
Castro could portray his regime as engaged in an heroic struggle 
against greater power and odds; mobilize the support of anti-
United States elements throughout Latin America; engage the 
sympathy of Latin American governments, which in earlier years 
had struggled with the problem of land reform ; and palm off his 
difficulties with the United States as an affair in which he was 
entitled either to Latin American support or to Latin American 
neutrality. 
4465 Stat. 72 (1951), Section 5; 19 U.S. Code 1362. 
45 46 Stat. 704 (1930); 19 U.S. Code 1338. 
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The United States was committed to joint action in Latin America 
in economic and security matters, and the Administration under-
standably took the view that the problems created by Castro were 
of such a nature that all American states should assist in solving 
them. It was important that a purely bilateral dispute between the 
United States and Cuba not be allowed to develop. 
Sequence of Events in 1959 and Early 1960 
Throughout the first half of 1959 there was justification for the 
belief that differences between the United States and Cuba were 
amenable to settlen1ent by negotiation. An Agrarian Reform Pro-
gram was clearly within the general authority of the Cuban govern-
ment. It seemed equally clear under international law that the 
method, time and amount of compensation were inadequate. 
The seizure of several Americ-an owned mills in the latter part 
of 1959 for sabotage of the 1960 sugar crop (failure to plant or 
maintain machinery) was arbitrary and without warrant under 
Cuban law, no hearings being given to the owners or receipts being 
tendered. These issues were fairly clear-cut, and there was no reason 
to suppose that a settlement could not be reached when the emotion 
of the revolution had subsided. 
During the latter half of 1959, however, the economic and political 
ties of Cuba with the Soviet Bloc became increasingly apparent and 
the hope of a settlement of claims by negotiation more remote. 
Moderate, or potentially anti-Communist, members of the Castro 
regime were purged and replaced by officials with a Communist 
record or Communist bias. Judges and lawyers fled the country in 
large numbers. No move was made by the Castro regime to secure 
economic aid from the United States, although aid would have been 
forthcoming if requested. 
When the Congress met in 1960, the Administration was prepared 
to seek standby authority in the President to reduce the sugar quota 
of any :foreign country except the Philippines when he found and 
proclaimed that a reduction was necessary to protect the national 
interest. No cut in the quota by the Congress was sought. 
The request was limited instead to a grant of flexible executive 
power so the quotas could be manipulated if the need arose. This 
would avoid action under the Tariff la-w and the legal complications 
that might arise under GATT and the separate Cuban agreements. 
The President or Secretary of Agriculture could not vary the 
minimum quota as the Sugar Act then stood. Variations in the 
quota above this minimum would require changes in the Secretary's 
estimates of probable annual consumption. These changes would 
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certainly disturb radically the price structure and producer and 
consumer interests within the United States. 
The request for authority by the Administration, unfortunately, 
came too late. Much time was to elapse before Congress could 
change the law. Although the President then took action promptly, 
the Soviet Union had, in the meantime, launched its economic 
sortie, cut away the remaining ground supporting the moderate 
opposition to Castro in Cuba, and lashed Cuba securely to the 
Bloc economy and political structure. 
No amendment to the Sugar Act of 1948 was passed by Congress 
until 3 July 1960. Then shortly before the recess of both Houses 
for the National Conventions, and after bitter debate, a standby 
power different from that requested by the President was granted. 
In the interim, tension between Cuba and the United States in-
creased and Cuba succeeded in harvesting and shipping most of its 
1960 sugar crop. 
Initial caution by Congress seems to have stemmed from the 
surge of threats from the Castro regime that the property of 
American nationals would be confiscated if the sugar quota was 
reduced. The effect of these threats apparently became less as the 
policy of the Castro regime became clearer eventually to con-
fiscate this property no matter what was done with the sugar quota. 
In the late spring of 1960 the Castro threats appeared to induce 
action by Congress rather than instill caution. 
Problem of Allocation of the Sugar Deficit 
A perplexing problem 'voven in and out of the debates was the 
mode of disposition of the sugar deficit if the Cuban quota was 
vacated. Just as the Administration proceeded gingerly in its 
action against Castro through apprehension of the effect of con-
fiscations of American property upon the forthcoming elections, so 
Democratic members of Congress feared the President might re-
allocate the Cuban sugar quota to influence domestic sugar beet and 
cane growers to vote in favor of his party during an election year. 
Lobbying was intense by both domestic and foreign producers who 
desired a slice of the Cuban share.46 
A long-term problem concerned the possible effect of vacation of 
the Cuban quota upon the regulatory system of the Sugar Act of 
1948. Administrative practice had been developed to support the 
quota system. Prices were controlled indirectly in a manner which 
46 An interesting account of the tribulations of both Houses shortly before 
the amendment was passed, including a description of the lobbying activities, 
appears in New York Times, 4 July 1960, p. 2, col. 1. 
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seemed generally satisfactory. The quota system meshed nicely with 
acreage controls upon domestic producers imposed under other 
statutes. 
I£ Cuba no longer furnished a large part o£ the United States 
requirements, then the quota system, £or foreign suppliers at least, 
made little sense. A major reduction in the Cuban sugar quota 
would quite probably require reconsideration o£ the policy underly-
ing the 1948 Act. 
The Amendment, as finally passed, extended the Sugar Act until 
31 March 1961 and empowered the President to set a new Cuban 
sugar quota £or 1960 and £or the first quarter o£ 1961.47 The 
President was authorized to reallocate to domestic producers 160,000 
tons which Cuba in turn had been reallocated £rom a deficit by 
Hawaii and Puerto Rico. Portions o£ the regular Cuban quota, i£ 
the quota was reduced, were to be reallocated in stipulated pro-
portions among foreign suppliers. 
The Amendment was viewed as a temporary expedient until the 
Sugar Act o£ 1948 could be considered by Congress in greater 
detail either after the recess £or the National Convention or in the 
new session o£ Congress following the Presidential elections. 
When it became evident that an amendment would pass before 
Congress recessed, passage o£ the amendment having been £or some 
time in doubt, Cuban suppliers hastened to load ships under the 
existing quota. By the time the Secretary o£ Agriculture suspended 
Cuban sugar imports, pending action by the President pursuant to 
the Amendment, and despite a prompt increase in ocean shipping 
costs, only 7 40,000 tons o£ the 1960 Cuban quota remained unfilled. 
This balance was reduced by the President by 95% on 6 July 1960.4'8 
While the Fabian strategy o£ the Castro-Communist regime, with 
the other £actors hitherto noted, had contributed to a delay in 
Amendment o£ the Sugar Act until the Cuban quota £or 1960 had 
been substantially filled, it was virtually certain that the Cuban 
quota £or the first quarter o£ 1961 would be eliminated. It was also 
generally considered that Congress would extend the power o£ the 
President to set the Cuban sugar quota through 1961. Since the 
Castro regime ·could not survive indefinitely on the dollars acquired 
during 1960 and upon confiscated American assets, its survival 
depended upon the speed and freedom with which Soviet Bloc 
assistance could be provided. 
-i'f 74 Stat. 330 (1960). 
48 25 Federal Register 6414 (Proc. 3355, 1960). Reduced to 39,752 short tons 
raw value plus sugar certified prior to 3 July 1960 but not yet entered or with-
drawn from warehouse for consumption. 
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E. THE SOVIET BLOC "ECONOMIC SORTIE" AND 
TERMINATION OF UNILATERAL POLICY BY THE 
UNITED STATES 
The gap widening between the United States and Cuba in late 
1959 and early 1960 provided a convenient entrance for a practiced 
and adroitly directed Soviet economic wedge. The groundwork had 
been laid during the Batista regime. The major Soviet problem was 
one of timing in order to complete the breach and smash Cuban 
internal opposition to Castro. 
Soviet sugar purchases from Cuba-made for political reasons 
since the Soviet Union was then a major sugar producer-commenced 
with an order for 500,000 tons in 1954. These orders were reduced 
gradually during the Batista regime to a low of 182,148 tons in 1958. 
These transactions enabled the Soviets to make contact with the 
Cuban sugar industry and officials in the Cuban government with 
economic functions even though diplomatic relations between the 
Soviet Union and Cuba were not maintained. By 1958, however, 
Cuban trade had not been reoriented towards the Soviet Bloc. 
After the Castro revolution in 1959, a Soviet order for Cuban 
sugar was announced. This was of 170,000 tons at 2.58 cents per 
pound. The sale was from holdover sugar owned by the Cuban 
Sugar Stabilization Institute. Payment was in dollars and furnished 
badly needed foreign exchange to the Castro government. An addi-
tional purchase of 330,000 tons was made in October at 2.905 cents 
per pound. A total of 500,000 tons was thus purchased during 1959. 
The vi~it of Mikoyan and a Soviet Trade Delegation to Cuba 
coincided with the beginning of consideration of the Sugar Act of 
1948 in the United States Congress. During Mikoyan's visit a cabled 
order for 345,000 tons at 2.78 cents per pound was received from 
the Soviet Union; and on 13 February 1960, a trade agreement 
between Cuba and the Soviet Union was announced. The Soviets 
agreed to purchase 5,000,000 tons of Cuban sugar over a period of 
five years and to extend Cuba credit to $100,000,000 repayable in 
goods or dollars in twelve equal installments at 2V2 % interest. 
Of the 5,000,000 tons which the Soviets agreed to purchase, 
1,375,000 tons were to be paid for in dollars at the free-market 
price prevailing at the time of purchase. The remaining tonnage 
was to be paid for in Soviet goods. 
The Agreement listed crude and refined petroleum, wheat, metals 
and newsprint, caustic soda and unspecified types of machinery as 
the articles of Soviet barter. Dollar values of the goods and the 
quantities of each to be delivered were not specified, these matters 
being left to supplementary bilateral agreements. In addition to her 
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sugar, Cuba was to export fruits and juices, vegetables, fibers and 
hides to the Soviet Union. 
Cuban spokesmen stated the agreement prohibited resale in Cuban 
markets o£ the sugar sold to the Soviet Union. This prohibition 
would not prevent the Soviets £rom selling their domestic pro-
duction in Cuban markets and replacing this deficit with Cuban 
sugar, nor would it prevent sale o£ sugar by the Soviet Union to 
the satellites and resale by the satellites in Cuban markets. 
I£ the Soviets followed either o£ these courses, they might be able, 
despite the efforts o£ the International Sugar Council, to disturb 
the world market, force down its price and destroy the traditional 
Cuban markets. This would increase the dependence o£ Cuba upon 
markets behind the Iron Curtain. 
When the Mikoyan Agreement was announced, Cuban representa-
tives stated they were assured o£ markets £or 700,000 tons in Japan, 
200,000 tons in Morocco and 500,000 tons in Red China. The Japanese 
and Moroccan markets 'vould be within the free-market quota held 
by Cuba. The Red Chinese market was a "new" market and not 
subject to the restrictions which the International Sugar Council 
might impose. 
The publicity received by these manifestations o£ accord between 
Cuba and the Soviet Bloc gave new hope to those in the United 
States and abroad who desired shares in a reallocated Cuban sugar 
quota. Pressure £or a quota cut was increased upon both Congress 
and the Administration. 
Considering himself adequately supported in view o£ the public 
announcements by his Soviet allies, Castro was emboldened to in-
crease his attacks upon the United States and elaborate his threats 
to United States property in Cuba. He reinforced his threats by 
seizure o£ the Santiago de Cuba Oil Refinery o£ Texaco, Inc., on 
29 June 1960 after refusal by its management to refine Soviet 
crude oil imported under the Mikoyan Agreement. On 2 July !960, 
he seized £or the same reason the remaining two refineries in Cuba, 
Esso (Cuba) Inc., a subsidiary o£ Standard Oil Company (New 
Jersey) and Shell Petroleum Corporation o£ Cuba, owned by 
Canadian Shell Ltd., a subsidiary o£ the Royal Dutch Shell Group. 
After Congress passed its amendment to the Sugar Act o£ 1948 on 
3 July 1960, and about fourteen hours before the President an-
nounced his reduction o£ the Cuban sugar quota, the Cuban Council 
o£ Ministers amended the Cuban Constitution to permit national-
ization o£ property o£ United States citizens, confiscation o£ property 
o£ persons found guilty by special courts o£ antirevolutionary 
activities, and confiscation o£ property o£ those who fled the 
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country to escape trial and "who are conspiring abroad" against 
the regime. 
Having anticipated Castro would probably carry his threats 
against American property into execution when his Soviet allies 
were publicly committed to his support, the United States, as its 
first step in multilateral action, submitted on 20 June 1960, a detailed 
memorandum to the Inter-American Peace Committee on the Orga-
nization o:f American States. This memorandum, entitled "Provoca-
tive Acts o:f the Government o:f Cuba Against the United States 
Which Have Served to Increase Tension in the Caribbean Area," set 
:forth in detail the :facts o:f Cuban-American relations since the 
Castro revolution. The Committee was informed that the United 
States would continue to provide other information relevant to 
the Committee's studies.49 Submission o:f the Memorandum was a 
prelude to presentation o:f the case o:f the United States to a meeting 
o:f the Council o:f Foreign Ministers o:f the Organization o:f American 
States. 
In the interim, Minister :for External Affairs Roa o:f Cuba, on 
11 July, charged before the Security Council o:f the United Nations 
that the United States had intervened in Cuban internal affairs 
and had committed acts o:f economic aggression.50 The acts o:f 
economic aggression cited were "continued threats o:f economic 
strangulation," influencing Cuban oil refineries to refuse to process 
crude oil owned by the Cuban government (the oil in question 
being that imported under the Mikoyan Agreement) and the extra-
ordinary power gran ted the President by Congress which he had 
exercised to reduce the sugar quota. 
By a :formula devised by the two Latin American members o:f 
the Security Council, Ecuador and Argentina, the Cuban com-
plaint was inscribed in the Agenda o:f the Security Council without 
objection by the United States. It was understood by Cuba, the 
United States and the remaining members o:f the Security Council 
that when Cuba had its hearing, the Council would adjourn con-
sideration o:f the dispute pending a report by the Organization o:f 
American States. Such a resolution was adopted by the Council 
on 18 July 1960. Other countries were urged by the Resolution to 
refrain :from action which might increase tension between Cuba and 
the United States.51 
Tension was stimulated rather than reduced. During July 1960, 
Castro :frantically tightened his economic and political ties with 
49 U.N. Doc., S/4388, 20 June 1960. 
oo U.N. Doc., S/4378, 11 July 1960. 
51 U.N. Doc., S/4395, 19 July 1960. 
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the Soviet Bloc. Chairman Khrushchev had been quick to condemn 
the cut in the Cuban sugar quota as "aggression"; and the Soviets 
agreed to purchase :from Cuba the unfilled part o:£ the United States 
quota :for 1960 :for dollars. The price was below the cost of pro-
duction but :furnished Cuba with needed :foreign exchange. 
On 14 July 1960 a Red Chinese trade delegation arrived in Cuba 
and contracted :for sugar purchases o:£ 500,000 tons per year for 
five years. Twenty percent o:£ the deliveries in the first year were 
to be purchased in pounds sterling. Payments :for the remainder of 
deliveries during the first year and all payments in subsequent years 
were to be in goods. 
The Red Chinese sale was in a new market, and consent o:£ the 
International Sugar Council to an increase in Cuba's :free-market 
quota was not required. The consent o:£ the Council was required 
:for that part o:£ the United States quota :for 1960 sold to the Soviet 
Union which exceeded the :free-market quota o:£ Cuba. The United 
States was not active in opposing the Cuban request for an in-
crease. 52 This inaction probably marks an abandonment o:£ hope 
by the Administration that purely unilateral measures by the United 
States in reducing or eliminating the sugar quota would affect 
significantly either the policies or the stability o:£ the Castro regime. 
Not only were Cuban requests :for quota increases usually treated 
with deference by the Sugar Council because o:£ Cuba's importance 
as a party to the International Sugar Agreement, but any action 
by the United States to oppose the quota increase would have been 
substantially without support. Only those Latin American states 
which had begun to appreciate the danger o:£ Communist direction 
o:£ the Castro regime and which had no significant economic stakes 
in Cuba would wholeheartedly support the United States position. 
Most o:£ these were not parties to the Agreement or had :few votes 
in the weighted voting system. 
Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the allies o:£ the United 
States in Western Europe viewed the contest with detached interest 
and could appreciate the potential market which Cuba might offer 
as its imports :from the United States declined. None o:£ these 
countries had reduced their purchases o:£ Cuban sugar and it is 
most unlikely that any would have been prepared to alienate 
Castro by supporting a United States effort to block a sale o:f 
several hundred thousand tons. 
From the point o:£ view o:£ the United States, the possible effect 
to be obtained upon the Castro regime by :frustrating the sale o:£ 
the remainder o:£ its 1960 U.S. quota probably was not worth the 
52 See New York Times, 20 July 1960, page 7, col. 3. 
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diplomatic effort which would have been required to secure the 
necessary backing in the Council. 
The Council also considered the Cuban request after the United 
States had submitted its memorandum of 20 June 1960 to the Inter-
American Peace Committee and the Security Council had made its 
Resolution of 18 July. With the United States policy reoriented to 
multilateral action in the Organization of American States, uni-
lateral pursuit of Cuba into the Sugar Council would lend credence 
to a Cuban argument that the United States rather than Cuba was 
the aggressor in the conflict. 
Unilateral action was taken by the United States after the Security 
Council Resolution of 18 July. But these measures can be considered 
little more than an effort to minimize the disruptive influence of 
the Castro regime in other Latin American countries by denying 
to it a supply of dollars and to preserve the status quo to the extent 
possible until the Organization of American States could consider 
the dispute. 
In a strategic sense, these additional economic measures were 
delaying actions in a retreat from an unsuccessful economic defense. 
The United States, for example, prohibited the use of International 
Cooperation Administration funds to purchase Cuban sugar.53 
Morocco, Iran and South Vietnam had been substantial Cuban 
customers. This move tended to shift the trade from dollars to 
barter. Morocco, for example, agreed to ship phosphate, sardines, 
trucks and other items to Cuba in return for sugar. In October 1960, 
the President placed an embargo upon export from the United 
States to Cuba pursuant to powers granted by the Export Control 
Act of 1949.·54 Excepted from the embargo were unsubsidized food-
stuffs, medicines and medical supplies. 
The embargo was supported by uncoordinated private action by 
creditors of Cuban importers or of the Cuban government. There 
being many unpaid Cuban accounts in the United States, sales of 
unembargoed items were for cash in advance. Creditors levied upon 
a number of items earmarked for export to Cuba, such as lard 
and diesel engines. They also blocked export of these items.55 
As the United States took its action supplemental to reduction 
of the sugar quota, Castro commen~d his expropriation of American 
property in Cuba. The Delicias and Cha parra Mills of American 
58 See New York Times, 20 August 1960, page 1, col. 2. 
54 25 Federal Register 8638 (October 1960). 
55 See, Trade with Cuba (Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st 
Sess. Doc. 75553, 1961) 25. 
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Sugar Company ·were seized on July 20th and the Mercidita Mill 
on July 22nd. On August 9th the general confiscation began. By the 
summer of 1961, approximately a year later, an estimated ten to 
fifteen million dollars out of an original billion dollars in American 
assets in Cuba remained in American hands. The reimbursement 
promised by the Castro regime \vas to be in fifty year Cuban bonds, 
payable from 25% of the receipts from all Cuban sugar sold in the 
United States in excess of 3,000,000 tons per year at a price of not 
less than 5.4 cents per pound. The expropriations were accompanied 
by the imposition of discriminatory licensing requirements upon 
United States goods, discriminatory duties, and reallocation of the 
United States rice quota to the Soviet Bloc. 
While this action by the Castro regime provided a legal basis for 
the abrogation of trade treaties with Cuba and an additional basis 
for complaint concerning Cuban actions before the Organization 
of American States, it also increased the dependence of the Castro 
regime upon the Soviet Bloc for markets and for technical assis-
tance in operating expropriated American businesses and industries. 
By 1961, approximately 70% of the trade ·with Cuba was with 
the Soviet Bloc and the remaining 30% with other European or 
American states. The Soviets agreed in September 1960, to pur-
chase all of the sugar which Cuba had formerly sold to the United 
States. The International Sugar Council was persuaded to increase 
Cuba's free-market quota by 3,000,000 tons to compensate for loss 
of the United States market. 
By the winter of 1960, the Soviet Union and satellites had com-
menced their destruction of Cuban markets through dumping. 
Quantities of Soviet sugar were offered on the London market 
below the prevailing market price.56 Poland and Czechoslovakia 
offered refined sugar on the London market for less than the price 
of raw. Similar sales were made in Iraq, Cey Ion and the Sudan. 
By a trilateral form of dumping, Cuban sugar became a species 
of currency for the satellites. A satellite bartered goods for Cuban 
sugar and then either bartered the sugar before shipment or sold 
it to other Bloc or non-Bloc countries. The shipment was then 
directed to the third party. These transactions became institutional-
ized, so that the satellites have become middlemen, standing between 
Cuba and her old markets, and ready to compete in any new markets 
Cuba might seek to develop. 
Cuba thus was forced into a position in which production costs 
had to be lowered by the use of unskilled volunteer labor in cane 
56 See New York Times, 10 March 1961, page 38, col. 3; 10 January 1961, page 
69, col. 1. 
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harvesting to continue to obtain foreign exchange in the free market. 
Also, increasingly larger quantities of sugar had to be exported at 
increasingly lower prices to attract new markets and offset the 
"market-destroying" effect of Soviet Bloc state trading practices. 
The Cuban request for an increased free-market quota to permit 
this expansion was opposed by the Soviet Union in the International 
Sugar Council in December 1961. The Council entered 1962 dead-
locked on the issue of quota increases.57 
Although Cuba had since announced sugar committed to several 
of the satellites will be withheld and sold to customers who furnish 
dollars or pounds sterling,58 she has been swept economically within 
the Soviet Bloc. The "free" sugar market and Cuba with it are 
firmly within the Soviet economic grip. 
F. MACROSEISMIC EFFECTS OF THE QUOTA MANIPULATION 
Manipulation of the Cuba sugar quota may or may not have set in 
motion a chain of events which will end an effective International 
Sugar Agreement. Nevertheless, the new sugar boycott of its 
principal foreign supplier clearly confronted the United States 
with political and economic problems which overshadowed the 
evanescent political considerations which appeared significant during 
the 1960 Congressional debates. 
By 23 July 1960, the wholesale sugar price in the United States 
was $9.70 per hundred pounds. This was the highest price since 
1923. The price increase was produced in part by higher shipping 
costs upon sugar obtained from sources more remote than Cuba and 
by the lack of a 20% tariff differential upon sugar obtained from 
these sources. Sugar refineries in the Eastern United States handled 
unrefined cane sugar only and could not refine beet sugar obtained 
within the United States without equipment modifications. 
To reduce the rising sugar price, the Secretary of Agriculture 
increased the estimated need in 1960 from 10,000,000 tons to 
10,400,000 tons. 61,840 tons of this increase were to be allocated to 
quota holders and the remainder was allocated to nonquota holders 
in foreign countries. Unutilized sugar beet acreage was reallocated 
57 See New York Times, 10 January 1962, page 69, col. 1. The proceedings of 
the Council are secret. The Cuban quota for 1961 had been set at 1,992,375 tons. 
The Council was prepared to add to this the 3,000,000 tons taken by the United 
States before 1959, but Cuba demanded that this increase be of the total 
4,860,000 tons committed to the Soviet Bloc, or a total free-market quota of 
7,285,000 tons. This would leave the previous 1,992,375 tons to be used in a 
search for new markets and convertible foreign exchange. 
58 See New York Times, 14 February 1962, page 1, col. 4. 
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to states, such as California, in which producers could make late 
beet plantings in 1960. In October 1960, domestic restrictions on 
sugar beet acreage were lifted. Waste everglades land in Florida 
was rapidly developed by Cuban emigres and others for cane 
production. 
The system of sugar production within the United States was 
upset by the emergency. Control of production, importation and 
prices under the Sugar Act of 1948 and related laws had been keyed 
to the participation of Cuba as a principal foreign supplier. A 
reduction or elimination of the Cuban sugar quota thus posed the 
problem of a parallel readjustment in the domestic system for con-
trolling sugar production and imports.59 
As the logic of the quota system for sugar supply was brought 
into question, the problem was posed for protection of domestic 
producers. Their production costs would be higher than those pre-
vailing in the territories of any foreign competitors. Innovations 
to protect these producers might have repercussions in the farm 
price support program generally. 
The Congress could be expected to consider matters such as these 
with care and deliberation. While Congress pondered these sensitive 
issues, the policy of the Administration concerning the Cuban sugar 
deficit and its by-products would have to be developed both in-
digenously and piecemeal. 
The principal problem in foreign affairs which the President was 
left to solve concerned the sugar quota of the Dominican Republic. 
The Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American 
States voted in August 1960 to condemn Dominican acts of aggres-
sion against Venezuela, to break diplomatic relations with the 
Dominican Republic, and partially to interrupt economic relations 
with that country. Trade in arms and implements of war was to be 
suspended entirely. Extension of this embargo to other articles was 
to be studied by the Council; but no action extending the embargo to 
items other than arms and implements of war was undertaken at 
this meeting. 
Pursuant to the formula prescribed by Congress in its Amend-
ment of July 1960, to the Sugar Act of 1948, the Dominican 
Republic was to participate in any reallocation of the Cuban sugar 
quota. The Secretary of Agriculture estimated that by reduction 
of the Cuban quota, the Dominican Republic would receive a re-
59 At the time of writing (1962), the Administration has prepared a new law 
for the control of domestic sugar production and sugar imports which, it is 
understood, drops the quota system, although the details of the law have not 
been disclosed. 
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allocation of approximately 322,000 tons over the 34,000 tons which 
it would have received prior to July 1960. 
Because of the advantageous price on the American market, the 
reallocation was a windfall to members of the Trujillo family, 
whose members controlled much of the Dominican sugar industry. 
The United States was in the position, as many felt, of rewarding 
one dictator while imposing a sanction against another. The Govern-
ment of Venezuela considered the windfall, while not in violation 
of the letter of the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers, not 
in accordance with the spirit of that decision. 
When Congress reconvened in August, following the National 
Conventions, the President, in addition to requesting an extension 
of the Sugar Act beyond the deadline of 31 March 1961 with con-
tinuing authority to reduce the Cuban quota, also requested authority 
to reallocate to other foreign suppliers the 322,000 ton quota which, 
by the Amendment of 1960, would pass to the Dominican Republic. 
This threat of economic action against the Dominican Republic, 
even though its regular quota v.ras not disturbed, proved an obstacle 
which prevented Congressional action concerning the sugar quota 
during the remainder of the session. The Congress adjourned with-
out extending the Act beyond the deadline of 31 March 1961 estab-
lished before its recess. 
While it then became necessary for the Secretary of Agriculture 
to authorize importation of 322,000 tons of Dominican sugar, an 
entry fee of 2 cents per pound was imposed upon sugar imported 
under this reallocated quota, the fee being payable in advance. 
This fee was based upon the provision in the Amendment of 1960, 
subjecting a reallocated quota "to such terms and conditions as 
* * * the President * * * deems appropriate under the prevailing 
circumstances." 
The Secretary determined that Dominican sugar in the national 
interest should be purchased at less than the United States market 
price. 60 The part of the Cuban quota allocated to the Dominican 
Republic consequently brought 3.7 cents per pound as against 5.7 
cents per pound which the sugar would have brought without the 
entry fee. While this price was still .45 cents above the world-
market price, the entry fee denied approximately $12,900,000 to the 
Dominican Republic. 
A somewhat different problem was presented by reallocation of the 
Cuban quota a1nong other quota and nonquota holders. Quota 
countries were quick to solicit increases and 'vere resentful of ap-
parent inequities in reallocations by the Adn1inistration. Nonquota 
oo 25 Federal Register 9197 (1960). 
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countries, such as India, seeking substantial allocations, could point 
with justification to the fact that the supported American price was 
a form o£ aid to the foreign supplier. 
Reallocation o£ the Cuban sugar quota thus became entangled in 
the delicate nuances o£ foreign aid. An award o£ part o£ the Cuban 
quota created a vested interest in the recipient. I£ Castro fell, the 
Cuban quota might be restored. The tendency o£ the recipient thus 
might be to support Castro to insure the breach between the United 
States and Cuba continued. I£ the reallocation proved temporary, 
the United States would have encouraged the foreign supplier to 
increase acreage to meet the new demand. This would leave it with 
an unmanageable surplus when the quota was restored. The Soviet 
Union, the major sugar producer, could then wreck the internal 
economy o£ the overexpanded sugar producer by disturbances o£ 
the free sugar market. 
G. THE DEFENSIVE PHASE OF ECONOMIC ACTION AGAINST 
CUBA: AN INTERIM JUDGMENT AND DEMONSTRATED 
NEED 
Sufficient time has not elapsed to permit an adequate appraisal 
o£ the economic measures developed by the United States against 
Cuba in the "sugar encounter." During 1961 Congress extended 
the Sugar Act until 30 June 1962 and authorized the President to 
exclude from reallocations any country with which the United 
States did not maintain diplomatic relations. Under this authority 
the Cuban sugar quota was entirely eliminated.61 
The Punta del Este Conference in 1962 voted to interrupt the 
traffic and trade in arms between Cuba and other countries in the 
Hemisphere. The Council o£ the Organization o£ American States 
was directed to consider the extension o£ this embargo and boycott 
to other items, with special attention to those o£ a strategic nature, 
although recommendations concerning such matters must now come 
from the Council. 
A boycott upon shipments o£ goods into the United States of 
Cuban origin and goods imposed from or through Cuba was imposed 
by the President in February 1962.62 Action may be taken to have 
61 75 Stat. 40 (1961). 
62 25 Federal Register 1085 ( 1962). Reliance was placed upon Section 620 (a) 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 75 Stat. 445, which authorizes the Presi-
dent to maintain a total embargo on all trade between Cuba and the United 
States. The term "boycott" is used in the text as a more accurate description 
of the effect of the President's proclamation, an embargo already existing on 
the outflow of trade from the United States to Cuba. 
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the Coordinating Committee of the Consultative Group apply 
its International List and trade restrictive techniques to Cuba.63 
The effects of these and other measures which may be adopted must 
be assessed in the future. 
At the present time the most sanguine tentative appraisal of these 
measures suggests only that time ·was bought within which Latin 
American action might be mobilized to contain the Castro-Com-
munist revolution by accelerating the drift of Cuba into the 
Soviet grip. Whether this will work ultimately to the political 
advantage or disadvantage of the United States will depend upon 
the effectiveness with which the purchased time is utilized. 
Economic pressure upon Cuba frustrated for the time being an 
extension of the Castro Revolution to other parts of Latin America. 
Loss of dollars derived from premium sales of sugar in the United 
States created unemployment in Cuba. The embargo of 1960 and 
its subsequent extension in 1962 have created serious shortages in 
food and hard ware. Although assistance from the Soviet Bloc 
might ultimately compensate for these deprivations, the Castro 
regime was, in the interim, forced to concentrate its attention upon 
internal problems and could devote only a small part of its time 
and even less of its resources to exportation of its political, social 
and economic doctrines. 
Manipulation of the quota created a Cuban emergency. Delay in 
the manipulation, coupled with the excitement and surge of patriot-
ism which the quota withdrawal created in Cuba, enabled Castro 
to purge his moderate follo,vers without embarrassing explanations 
to the Cuban public of the facts behind the ousters. Redirection of 
Cuban trade was forced at a time when only the Soviet Bloc had 
both the capacity for absorbing it quickly and the political motive 
for soliciting actively Cuban requests for markets and economic 
assistance. 
63 A suggestion of the outline of probable future action may be found in the 
testimony of Secretary of State Rusk appearing in Investigation and Study of 
the Administration, Operation and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 
1949 and Related Acts, Part II (Hearings Before the Select Committee on Ex-
port Control, House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. Doc. 77836, 1962) 
606-610 ; 615-620 ; 625 ; 626. 
